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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
A group finance company (or treasury company) is often established within a „group 
of companies‟1 on the basis that all excess cash of the group will be deposited with 
that finance company and said finance company will act as a moneylender to the rest 
of the group.2  It is however not only the finance company that acts as a lender; loan 
accounts commonly exist between various companies within a group.  These loans are 
required for a number of reasons, ranging from capital to operating requirements.  It 
also happens that goods are supplied or services rendered between companies within 
the group which are not immediately paid for but remain outstanding on the loan 
account.   
For a number of reasons it could happen that a company within the group does not 
have the means to settle an amount owing to another company within the group.  The 
recent recession further contributed to this, and the closure and restructuring of 
companies has been widely publicised.3  These outstanding loans are invariably 
extinguished through various means.4  This raises the question of whether the 
extinction of these intra-group5 loans could have unforeseen tax implications within 
the group. 
The above-mentioned question is compounded because of the fact that South Africa 
does not have a system of group taxation; each company within a group is taxed in its 
own capacity.  A number of tax concessions6 are however granted for companies 
within the same group to eliminate unwarranted tax consequences caused by certain 
                                                 
1
 „Group of companies‟ as defined in section 41 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1961 (the ITA) 
2
 Also refer to Solaglass Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v CIR (1991 A), 53 SATC 1 where the use of 
such a finance company was described 
3
 An example hereof can be found in an article published on the Sake24.com website (South African 
Press Association, 2010) – In that article Statistics South Africa stated that the total number of 
liquidations recorded for May 2010 was up 35.7% year-on-year 
4
 The various means though which loans could be extinguished will be discussed in Chapter 2 of this 
paper 
5
 „Intra-group‟ refers to a transaction between two or more companies that form part of the same „group 
of companies‟ as that term is defined in section 41 of the ITA 
6
 Refer Part III of Chapter II to the ITA 
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transactions within that group.  This raises the next question: Is the extinction of these 
intra-group loans adequately covered by these concessions or is there any reason(s) 
why it should not be?  A negative answer to the first part of this question often causes 
companies within a group to enter into elaborate schemes and transactions in an 
attempt to shift around income and losses between those group companies to achieve 
favourable tax results.   
The waiver of loans7 has always been a widely debated and controversial subject, 
more so after the introduction of Capital Gains Tax (CGT), and specifically because 
of the introduction of paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
No. 58 of 1962 (the ITA).8  Yet, despite there being much literature on paragraph 
12(5), and its interaction between sections 20(1)(a)(ii) and 8(4)(m) of the ITA,9 the 
South African Revenue Service (the “Commissioner” or “SARS”) was recently 
requested to provide a binding private ruling (BPR) on this very issue.  BPR 073 was 
therefore issued by SARS on 29 January 2010. It provides important insight into 
SARS‟ view on this topic and how it would consequently treat the extinction of intra-
group debt. 
It should however be noted that disputes arise as a result of the fact that taxpayers and 
SARS have different interpretations regarding the application of the ITA.  Judgements 
by the courts create precedents for these matters which are usually adhered to in 
subsequent court cases depending on the status of the court delivering the judgement.  
Such judgements are also used by SARS and by taxpayers as a reference when they 
apply the ITA to a specific issue.  A BPR by no means creates such a precedent and 
the courts have held on a number of occasions that a taxpayer cannot rely on SARS 
practice if it is different to legal interpretation.10 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A BPR merely sets out SARS‟ opinion on its interpretation of certain sections of the 
                                                 
7
 Used interchangeably with the term „extinction of debt‟ 
8
 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to paragraphs refer to that specific paragraph in the Eighth 
Schedule to the ITA 
9
 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to sections refer to that specific section of the ITA 
10
 Refer ITC 1830 (2007 G), 70 SATC 123 
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ITA and has no authority for any person other than the applicant thereof.11  However, 
this does give a clear indication of how SARS would deal with similar issues in 
practice.  Whereas section 8(4)(m) has remained unchanged since it was added by 
section 6(1)(b) of Act No 28 of 1997, section 20(1)(a)(ii) and paragraph 12(5) have 
been amended on a number of occasions.  It is therefore important to determine 
whether the questions raised in previous studies have now been addressed and 
whether the ruling agrees to the interpretation of tax practitioners and experts or 
whether it could be challenged in a court of law where differences exist. 
 
1.3 RATIONALE 
The reason for choosing to carry out this research is because of the uncertainty, 
controversy and misunderstanding that still surround this topic.  An attempt will now 
be made to resolve such uncertainty.  As noted before, the extinction of intra-group 
debt is common practice but yet the treatment thereof remains inconsistent.  Different 
opinions exist between various tax advisors and academics alike.  These different 
opinions will be summarised and analysed in this research paper.  Previous studies on 
this topic were mostly carried out before the latest amendments were made, and it is 
therefore important to revisit this topic. 
Furthermore, a practical question will now be tested against the existing literature, 
and a conclusion reached on the BPR issued by SARS. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this study is to understand the tax consequences arising from 
the extinction of intra-group loans, specifically where the debtor company has an 
assessed loss, and with particular reference to the ruling in BPR 073.  The essential 
question that will be examined is the following:  To what extent would sections 
8(4)(m) and 20(1)(a)(ii) and paragraph 12(5) apply to a situation where an intra-group 
loan is extinguished and the debtor company has an assessed loss or previously had an 
assessed loss that was subsequently interrupted? 
                                                 
11
 Section 76H(4) 
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In order to achieve the primary objective the following secondary objectives were set: 
 Analyse the meaning of „extinction of a loan‟ for the purposes of sections 
8(4)(m) and 20(1)(a)(ii) and paragraph 12(5). 
 Determine the continued relevance of section 8(4)(m) after the ruling given in 
the Omnia Fertilizer case12, because a number of academic writers commented 
that section 8(4)(m) is potentially no longer relevant after the Omnia Fertilizer 
judgement (supra). 
 Analyse section 20(1)(a)(ii) and its interaction with section 8(4)(m). 
 Determine the applicability of the Eighth Schedule. 
 
1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This study is limited to income tax in terms of the ITA, including legislation 
promulgated up to 30 September 2009 (Taxation Laws Amendment Act, No. 17 of 
2009 and the Taxation Laws Second Amendment Act, No. 18 of 2009) with specific 
reference to sections 8(4)(m) and 20(1)(a)(ii) and paragraph 12(5) and their 
interaction in this context.  A brief analysis of other provisions of the ITA dealing 
with the extinction of debt will also be given.  Paragraph 12(5) has been analysed in 
various studies and could possibly not apply to the extinction of intra-group debt, 
hence this study will only focus on its applicability in that scenario and will further 
only provide an overview of its application in general.   
A detailed discussion of the Corporate Rules (sections 41 to 47) falls outside the 
scope of this study.  Donations tax (sections 54 to 64) is also not referred to in this 
research paper, as donations made by a company to any other company that is a 
member of the same group of companies are exempt from donations tax (section 
56(1)(r)).  Secondary tax on companies (STC) (sections 64B and 64C) is also not 
covered because a company can elect that dividends declared by the company to a 
resident shareholder that forms part of the same group of companies be exempt from 
the payment of STC.  The dividend should, moreover, be paid out of profits earned 
during the period when the shareholder formed part of the group (section 64B(5)(f)).  
                                                 
12
 Omnia Fertilizer Ltd v CSARS (2003 SCA), 65 SATC 159 
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The study will only deal with groups of companies that are all registered, managed 
and controlled in South Africa; all aspects of international tax (including, but not 
limited to, transfer pricing and thin capitalisation (section 31)) will be ignored.  This 
paper will not include indirect taxes (such as value-added tax, transfer duty and 
securities transfer tax). 
 
1.6 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This research paper will primarily be a literature study.  Firstly, a study of the relevant 
literature is required to gain a body of knowledge regarding the current interpretation 
of the extinction of intra-group loans by the taxing authorities and the tax community, 
and to understand the relationship between sections 8(4)(m) and 20(1)(a)(ii) and the 
Eighth Schedule to the ITA in that context.  Secondly, the knowledge gained from the 
literature study will be used to investigate the ruling issued by SARS in BPR 073.  
Emphasis will be given to those points where disagreement exists between the 
outcome of the literature study and the ruling given.  Finally, a conclusion is reached 
and summarised.   
The reason for choosing this approach is to consolidate the numerous literature on this 
topic and test it against a practical scenario, and then incorporate all into a single 
document.  This would facilitate future analysis and evaluation of this topic. 
The information will be gathered from relevant legislation, textbooks, articles (setting 
out the views of reputable legal and tax experts) published in legal and business 
journals and on relevant Internet websites, completed research studies and applicable 
court cases.  The information will then be summarised, documented and evaluated.  
The case study details will primarily be taken from BPR 073 issued by SARS on 29 
January 2010.   
 
1.7 INTERPRETATION OF FISCAL LEGISLATION 
In analysing the relevant sections of the ITA it is important to interpret it in terms of 
the rules adopted by our courts.  Those rules that will be used for the purpose of this 
paper are now described. 
 6 
In the English case of Partington v The Attorney-General13 Lord Cairns laid down the 
following rule of interpretation: 
“If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, 
however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be.  On the other hand, 
if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of 
the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the law the case might 
otherwise appear to be.  In other words, if there be an equitable construction, 
certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute, where you can 
simply adhere to the words of the statute.”14 
Our courts have accepted this rule when interpreting our statutes and have held that, 
in the interpretation of fiscal laws, our courts must apply the literal language of a 
statute, where such language is unambiguous and its meaning is clear.15  The court 
should not apply the literal language if it would lead to “… absurdity so glaring that it 
could never have been contemplated by the legislature, or if it leads to a result 
contrary to the intention of Parliament as shown by the context or by such other 
considerations as the court is justified into taking into account”.16   
Also refer Shenker v The Master and Another17 where the judge said that it is 
dangerous to speculate as to the intention of the legislature and what seems an 
absurdity to one man does not appear absurd to another.  He goes on to say that the 
absurdity must be utterly glaring and the intention of the legislature must be clear, and 
not a mere matter of surmise or probability.18    
Where it is found that the wording of the statute is not absurd but merely ambiguous, 
the court will follow an interpretation favourable to the taxpayer and against the 
fiscus.  This is called the contra fiscum rule of interpretation.19  In CIR v Widan20 the 
Appellate Division made it clear that the contra fiscum rule only found application 
where there is doubt as to the intention of the legislature. 
                                                 
13
 21 LT 370 (HL) 
14
 As cited in Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR (1975 A), 37 SATC 319 at pp 333-334 
15
 Steyn, 2009 (“Steyn”) at p 5 
16
 See Venter v Rex 1907 TS 910; Shenker v The Master and Another 1936 AD 136; Barkett v SA 
Mutual Trust and Assurance Company Ltd 2 SA 353 and Savage v CIR 18 SATC 1 at p 9 
17
 1936 AD 136 at p 143 
18
 As cited by Steyn at p 8 
19
 Refer Steyn at p 13 
20
 (1955 A), 19 SATC 341 at p 352 
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In Badenhorst & others v CIR21 the Appellate Division considered the relevance of 
equity in the context of fiscal legislation.  At p 49 the court said that the mere 
existence of hardship or inequity resulting from the application of the plain provisions 
of fiscal legislation is beside the point.  Hardship and inequity are not to be used for 
the purpose of reading into plain terms a meaning that they do not otherwise bear, so 
that where logic and argument by analogy show that it would be equitable for a 
person to escape tax in certain circumstances because he would escape tax in 
specified other analogous circumstances, equity is not allowed to equate the two sets 
of circumstances.22   
It also happens that our courts find that they cannot make sense of the wording of the 
legislation because it appears that certain word(s) have been omitted.  The court 
would then add to or replace wording in the statute, in order to make it read in a 
manner that the court finds logical and which the court holds was probably the 
intention of the legislature, having regard to the main aim of the legislation and the 
context in which the wording appears. The court would also use other rules of 
construction permitted by common law.23 
In the interpretation of statutes courts have cautioned taxpayers against relying on 
practices followed by SARS and on practice notes issued by SARS.  This is because 
the Commissioner is not always consistent in following those practices and will not be 
allowed by the courts to rely on a practice note where it is in contravention of the 
provisions of the ITA.24 
In Baron & Jester v Eastern Metropolitan Local Council25 the judge highlighted the 
following aspects as set out by Kellaway, 1995 (“Kelleway”) on the evolution of the 
„golden rule‟26 of interpretation in the South African context: 
 Interpretatio quae pari absurdum non est admittenda (an interpretation that 
creates an absurdity is not acceptable). 
 The function of a Court of Law is to construe the language of the legislature 
                                                 
21
 (1955 N), 20 SATC 39 
22
 Also refer Steyn at p 12 
23
 Refer Steyn at p 14 
24
 Refer ITC 1675 (1998 G), 62 SATC 219 and Steyn at p 21 
25
 [2002] JOL 9412 W 
26
 See Kellaway at p 57 
 8 
and arrive at its intention in that way, it has no power to redraft or alter the 
language.27 
 Intention must clearly appear either from the language used, or from the nature 
of the enactment.  We are not, in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, 
restricted to the language of the enactment, but may look at the surrounding 
circumstances, and may consider its objects, its mischief and its 
consequences.28 
 The context in which the words appear is a relevant factor in construing a 
statute.  
 The ascertainment of the purpose of the legislation concerned is of cardinal 
importance in ascertaining the meaning thereof. 
 There can be no mere speculation as to the purpose of the legislation.  It is 
necessary to carefully consider the entire Act, including, but not limited to, the 
short title, the long title, the headings, the interrelationship between the 
enacting clauses, the surrounding circumstances, and the apparent scope and 
purpose thereof.29  
 The court may, on a full and proper consideration of the enactment, find that 
its purpose is manifest.  Thus, ex ratione legis colligitur mens legis (when the 
purpose of the law ceases, the law ceases) and quia voluntas semper potior est 
voce dicentis (the purpose of an enactment is always more powerful than the 
words used).30 
 Kellaway31 further notes the following: 
“For more than half a century in South Africa, courts have given effect to the manifest 
purpose of an enactment where the language was not clear in a provision of an Act 
that had to be interpreted. And where the scope of a provision in a statute appeared to 
be wide, its extent was necessarily restricted, or extended, to give effect to the manifest 
purpose of the Act.”32 
                                                 
27
 Per Stratford JA at p 480 in Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In re Rex v Jacobson & Levy 1931 AD 466 
28
 Per Innes CJ at p 541 in Union Government v Tonkin 1918 AD 533 
29
 Baron & Jester (supra) at p 12 
30
 Kellaway at p 67 
31
 At p 68 
32
 As cited in Baron & Jester (supra) at pp 13-14 
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The approach of Hurt AJA in CSARS v Airworld CC and Another33 is as follows:  
“In recent years courts have placed emphasis on the purpose with which the 
Legislature has enacted the relevant provision. The interpreter must endeavour to 
arrive at an interpretation which gives effect to such purpose. The purpose (which is 
usually clear or easily discernible) is used, in conjunction with the appropriate 
meaning of the language of the provision, as a guide in order to ascertain the 
legislator‟s intention.”34  
Hurt AJA also refers to the words of Nienaber JA in De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd v 
CSARS35 when dealing with the meaning of „export‟ for the purpose of section 20(4) 
of the Customs and Excise Act No. 92 of 1964 – which draws a distinction between 
export and home consumption- 
 “…the word must „take its colour, like a chameleon, from its setting and surrounds in 
the Act‟.”36 
In analysing the different sections of the ITA the rules summarised above will be 
considered to ensure that proper effect is given to the purpose of the relevant sections.  
 
1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH PAPER 
The research study will comprise seven chapters.   
1.8.1 Introduction 
This current chapter describes the background to the study.  The problem statement is 
defined, the importance of the study is emphasised and the research objectives are 
outlined.  Furthermore, the research methodology is given and the scope of the study 
demarcated.  The rules of interpretation are also addressed to the extent required for 
the purpose of this paper. 
                                                 
33
 70 SATC 48 
34
 At pp 59-61 
35
 (2002 SCA), 65 SATC 14 
36
 As cited in Airworld (supra) at p 61 
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1.8.2 The meaning of the term ‘extinction of debt’ in the context of sections 
8(4)(m) and 20(1)(a)(ii) and the Eighth Schedule 
Chapter 2 will focus on the nature of the relevant legal terms dealing with the 
extinction of debt.  The intention will be to analyse the different means by which a 
loan (debt) can be extinguished.  The relationship between the different terms will be 
investigated and discussed.   
1.8.3 Details of the case study 
Chapter 3 will set out the details of the case study that will be used to analyse the tax 
consequences of the extinction of intra-group loans.   
1.8.4 An interpretation of section 8(4)(m) 
In Chapter 4 an attempt will be made to analyse the provisions of section 8(4)(m).  
The reasons necessary for the introduction of this section to the ITA will be looked at 
briefly.  This section may be considered by some to be self-explanatory, but it will be 
demonstrated that it is not always easy to consider the applicability of this section.  
The effect of the Omnia Fertilizer case (supra) on the relevance of this section will 
also be discussed in this chapter. 
1.8.5 Section 20(1)(a)(ii) and its interaction with section 8(4)(m) 
The main literature published on section 20(1)(a)(ii) will be summarised in Chapter 5 
and the legislature‟s intention with the latest amendment(s) to this section will be 
analysed.  A conclusion will be reached as to whether the issues identified by 
previous writers have now been addressed through the latest amendment(s). 
1.8.6 The applicability of the Eighth Schedule 
Chapter 6 will provide a brief overview of paragraph 12(5) and other applicable 
paragraphs relating to the extinction of loans in general.  The group company 
exemption will be discussed to determine when this paragraph could be applicable in 
a group scenario.   
 11 
1.8.7 Conclusion 
In Chapter 7 a conclusion is reached and recommendations are presented. 
 12 
CHAPTER 2: THE MEANING OF THE TERM ‘EXTINCTION 
OF DEBT’ IN THE CONTEXT OF SECTIONS 
8(4)(m) and 20(1)(a)(ii) and THE EIGHTH 
SCHEDULE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The financing of a company‟s capital and/or operating requirements is a common 
concept in modern society.  There are various channels through which the financing 
could be realised and, given the constant technological improvements, this could also 
become very complex.  This would include financing through the traditional loan 
agreement to preference share schemes, options, hedge funding, etc.  Invariably the 
debtor (person requiring funding) would settle its obligation with the creditor (person 
providing funding) in terms of the agreement. 
There are, naturally, various ways through which the obligation could be settled.  
Accordingly, in this chapter there will be a discussion of the nature of the relevant 
legal terms used in the sections37 dealing with the extinction of debt.  The intention is 
to analyse the different means by which a loan (debt) could be extinguished as 
described in the different sections.  The relationship between the different terms will 
also be investigated and discussed.   
 
2.2 TERMINOLOGY USED 
The sections relevant to this research paper make use of different terms to describe the 
term „extinction of debt‟ as a requirement for each specific section.  In terms of 
section 8(4)(m) the debt38 should be extinguished as a result of “the cancellation, 
termination or variation of an agreement or due to the prescription, waiver or release 
of a claim for payment”.  However, in terms of section 20(1)(a)(ii) the extinction of 
                                                 
37
 In this context the term sections collectively refers to sections 8(4)(m) and 20(1)(a)(ii) as well as 
paragraph 12(5) 
38
 The term „obligation‟ is used in the section 
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the debt39 should result from “a concession granted by or compromise made with any 
creditor”.  Lastly, paragraph 12(5)(a) requires the debt40 to be “reduced or discharged 
by that creditor”. 
 
2.3 DEBT 
The term „debt‟ will now be considered based on the different meanings attributable 
to it in the specific sections of the ITA.  For the purpose of this paper, the term „debt‟ 
will be used to describe the various terms „obligation,‟41 „liability‟42 and „debt owed‟43 
as used in the context of the different sections and these terms will be used 
interchangeably throughout this paper.   
2.3.1 Obligation 
The term obligation is defined as “[a] binding agreement committing a person to a 
payment or other action.”44  According to A Dictionary of Finance and Banking in 
Economics & Business it is “[t]he duty of a borrower to repay a loan and that of the 
lender to ensure that repayment is made.”45  An obligation is further also described as 
“a legal or jural bond (jural tie) between two legal subjects in terms of which the one, 
the creditor, has a right to a particular performance against the other, the debtor, while 
the debtor has a corresponding duty to render the performance.”46  Therefore, the 
contents of an obligation could be summarised as the right of performance and the 
corresponding duty to perform.47   
There are different types of performance in terms of an obligation, namely dare 
(paying a specific amount or delivering a specific thing), facere (doing something, 
i.e., rendering a particular service) and non facere (to refrain from doing something).48  
                                                 
39
 The term „liability‟ is used in the section 
40
 The term „debt owed‟ is used in the paragraph 
41
 As used in section 8(4)(m) 
42
 As used in section 20(1)(a)(ii) 
43
 As used in paragraph 12(5) 
44
 Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2010 
45
 A Dictionary of Finance and Banking, 2008 
46
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 218; also refer Van der Merwe et al., 2007 at p 3, where it is stated 
that there can be more than two parties to an obligation 
47
 See Van der Merwe et al., 2007 at p 2 
48
 See Van der Merwe et al., 2007 at p 3 
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The main sources of obligations are contract, delict, negotiorum gesto („saak-
waarneming‟) and enrichment.49  As we are only concerned here with obligations 
arising through contract,50 the reference to obligations will be considered in that 
context.51   
2.3.2 Liability 
Liability is said to mean „something for which one is liable; a financial obligation‟.52  
The words „obligations‟ and „liabilities‟ are often used interchangeably, and the word 
„liabilities‟ as used in section 20(1)(a)(ii) concerns itself with contractual obligations 
and will be used as such for the purpose of this paper.53   
2.3.3 Debt owed 
McAllister54 suggests that the words „debt owed‟ as used in paragraph 12(5) refer to 
amounts in respect of which there is an unconditional liability to pay, and that this 
would include debts incurred that are not yet due and payable.   
The term „debt‟ is not defined and the courts have therefore held that it must be given 
a wide and general meaning.55  In Stockdale and Another v Stockdale56 it was held to 
include any liability arising from and being due (debitum) or owing under a contract.57   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49
 See Van der Merwe et al., 2007 at p 6 – these are however not the only sources of obligations 
50
 i.e. obligations as the legal consequence of a contract 
51
 Also refer comments of Cilliers, 2000 (“Cilliers”) at p 3 in footnote 18 
52
 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 
53
 Also refer Cilliers paras 1.5-1.7 at pp 2-4 
54
 McAllister, 2010 at p 85  
55
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 21 at para 125 and the case cited in footnote 2 
56
 (2003 C), 3 All SA 358 
57
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 21 at para 125 
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Also, „debt‟ in relation to the Prescription Act58 refers to an obligation to do 
something, whether by payment or by the delivery of goods and services, or not to do 
something.59  Debt is therefore the duty to perform in terms of an obligation.60  
The meaning of the term „debt is due‟, as used in the Prescription Act, has also been 
considered by our courts on numerous occasions.  It has been held that a debt must be 
immediately enforceable before it can be claimed.61  Therefore, normally, a debt is 
„due‟ when it is claimable by the creditor and, consequently, payable by the debtor.62  
In Deloitte Haskins & Sells Consultants (Pty) Ltd v Bowthorpe Hellerman Deutsch 
(Pty) Ltd,63 the court held that, for prescription to commence running, “there has to be 
a debt in respect of which the debtor is under an obligation to perform immediately”.64  
In The Master v IL Back & Co Ltd65 it was held that the words “debt is due” in section 
12(1) of the Prescription Act meant there had to be a money obligation presently 
claimable by the creditor, for which an action could be brought against the debtor.  
The debt must be one in respect of which the debtor is under an obligation to pay 
immediately.66 
Van Heerden JA in Truter & another v Deysel,67 in relation to section 12(1) of the 
Prescription Act, said the following:  
“[T]he term „debt due‟ means a debt, including a delictual debt, which is owing and 
payable.  A debt is due in this sense when the creditor acquires a complete cause of 
action for the recovery of the debt, that is, when the entire set of facts which the 
creditor must prove in order to succeed with his or her claim against the debtor is in 
place or, in other words, when everything has happened which would entitle the 
                                                 
58
 Prescription Act No. 68 of 1969 (the “Prescription Act”) 
59
 Refer Joubert and Faris, Vol 21 at para 125 and the cases cited in footnote 4. See Electricity Supply 
Commission v Stewarts & Lloyds of SA (Pty) Ltd (1981 A), 3 SA 340 at pp 344F-G, in which it was 
held that a debt is “that which is owed or due; anything as money, goods or services which one person 
is under an obligation to pay or render to another”. Also see Leviton & Son v De Klerk‟s Trustee 1914 
CPD 685 at p 691 et seq, where debt was held to mean “whatever is due – debitum – from any 
obligation”.  
60
 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.4.4 at p 557 
61
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 21 at para 125 and authorities cited in footnote 10 
62
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 21 at para 125 and the cases cited in footnote 11 
63
 (1991 A), 1 SA 525  
64
 Refer Singh v CSARS (2003 SCA), 65 SATC 203. In Desai v Desai (1996 A), 1 SA 141 at p 146I it 
was stated that (referring to the Prescription Act) “the term „debt‟ is not defined in the Prescription Act 
but in the context of section 10(1) it has a wide and general meaning, and includes an obligation to do 
something or to refrain from doing something” – Joubert and Faris, Vol 21 at para125. 
65
 (1983 A), 1 SA 986 
66
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 21 at para 125 and the cases cited in footnote 15 
67
 (2006 SCA), 4 SA 168 
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creditor to institute action and to pursue his or her claim.”68 
The above dictum would suggest that a debt must be owed and payable for it to be 
due.  Therefore, it appears that a debt could be owed without being due.  This could 
be illustrated through an instalment sale agreement whereby the debt is owed 
immediately but only becomes due at each instalment date. 
 
2.4 EXTINCTION OF DEBT 
Debt can be extinguished in a number of different ways.  The sections also use 
different phrases as requirements for that specific section with reference to the 
extinction of debt, as indicated in 2.2.   
Contractual obligations (debt) are extinguished (terminated) by a juristic act or by an 
operation of law.69  Extinction by a juristic act includes termination by performance, 
release, novation, compromise or a condition (suspensive or resolutive) in the 
contract.  On the other hand, extinction by operation of law happens by supervening 
impossibility of performance, extinctive prescription, merger (confusio) or set-off.70  
In terms of an agreement or by operation of law, it could also happen that a party to 
an obligation has the right to terminate the obligation unilaterally.71   
2.4.1 Termination by performance 
The obvious object of every obligation is performance by the debtor as specified in 
the agreement.72  Once the debtor has performed in terms of the agreement it follows 
that the purpose of the obligation has been achieved.73  The obligation has no further 
effect and is terminated.  An obligation is thus extinguished or terminated when its 
terms are complied with,74 i.e., the debtor has performed in terms of his obligation.  It 
                                                 
68
 At p 9 
69
 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.1 at p 511 
70
 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.1 at pp 511-512 
71
 Refer Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 241 and cases cited in footnote 1. The breach of an obligation 
may, for example, entitle the innocent party to terminate the obligation, and so may fraud, duress or 
undue influence. Unilateral termination will not be considered in further detail for the purpose of this 
paper. 
72
 Refer 2.3.1 
73
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 236 
74
 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 – the intention of the parties must also be to extinguish the obligation 
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is noted that a third party could also perform on the debtor‟s behalf, but that third 
party must have intended to discharge the debtor‟s debt unconditionally.75 
Furthermore, performance must be rendered to the creditor or its agent76 and if it is 
rendered to any other person the debtor is not discharged.77  The creditor may, 
however, direct the debtor to perform to a third person and should the debtor comply 
he or she is also discharged.78   
The creditor is further entitled to full performance and may reject partial performance, 
unless it is so stipulated in an agreement.79  If partial performance is accepted the 
debtor is discharged pro tanto.80   
Performance of an obligation is usually a bilateral jural act81 that requires the 
cooperation and agreement of both debtor and creditor.82   
The facts of each case will need to be considered to determine whether any of sections 
8(4)(m), 20(1)(a)(ii) or paragraph 12(5) could find application if there is proper 
performance but such performance is for less than the full face value of the debt.83 
 
 
                                                 
75
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 236 and cases cited in footnote 3 
76
 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.2.5 at p 524 
77
 Refer Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 236 and cases cited in footnote 8. In Bouwer v Saambou Bank 
Bpk (1993 T), 4 SA 492 at pp 500A-501C the court, discussing inter alia the statements that 
“performance must be rendered to the creditor” and that “if it is rendered to any other person the debtor 
is not discharged”, held that authority exists for the view that the rule as stated therein is subject to an 
exception which the court framed as follows (p 501C): that if a debtor has an acceptable reason for 
believing that a particular act, even though not actually authorised by his creditor, would amount to a 
discharge of his obligation towards the creditor, and he bona fide so acts and the creditor‟s estate is 
enriched thereby, then the debtor is discharged to the extent that the creditor‟s estate is enriched. 
78
 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.2.5 at p 524 
79
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 236 
80
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 236 and cases cited in footnote 17 
81
 Refer Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 236 in footnote 23 – „usually‟ but not invariably. 
Obligationes non faciendi do not require the cooperation of the creditor for their performance and even 
obligationes faciendi can sometimes be performed by the debtor without the creditor‟s cooperation. 
82
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 236 and authorities cited in footnote 24 
83
 Also refer 6.3.1.4 
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2.4.2 Release84 
Release takes place when a creditor and debtor agree that the debtor is released from 
the obligation between them.85  In other words, it is an agreement86 between creditor 
and debtor to terminate the obligation.87   
It has been submitted that an agreement to release will amount to a donation by the 
creditor to the debtor,88 but an intention to donate is not a requirement for a valid 
release;89 for instance, a mutual release from reciprocal obligations is not a donation.90  
A release agreement may be oral, even where the original obligation arose from a 
written contract, unless the contract contains a „non-cancellation‟ clause.91  The effect 
of the release depends on the intention of the parties.92  The onus of proving a release 
is on the person who claims to have been released.93   
The terms „waiver‟ or „release‟ are specifically used in section 8(4)(m) but that does 
not detract the terms also finding application in section 20(1)(a)(ii) and paragraph 
12(5).  This is because, in my opinion, the „waiver‟ or „release‟ would be a concession 
granted by the creditor and a reduction or discharge of the debt.  
2.4.3 Novation 
Novation is an agreement94 whereby an obligation is terminated by the creation of a 
new one in its place.95   
One type of novation would be whereby the original parties to the agreement merely 
                                                 
84
 Occasionally referred to as waiver – Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.3.1 at p 526 
85
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 238 and cases cited in footnote 1 
86
 As such must comply with the general requirements imposed by law for the validity of agreements – 
Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.3.1 at p 528 
87
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 238 and cases cited in footnote 2 
88
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 238 and cases cited in footnote 3 
89
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 238 and cases cited in footnote 4 
90
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 238 and cases cited in footnote 5 
91
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 238 and cases cited in footnote 7 
92
 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para13.3.1 at p 528 
93
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 238 and cases cited in footnote 8 
94
 The agreement must comply with all the general requirements imposed by the law for an agreement 
to have juridical consequences – Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.3.2 at pp 531-532 
95
 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.3.2 at p 530 
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substitute a new obligation for the original obligation.96  Novation may also have the 
intention to substitute a new party (delegatus) for one of the original parties 
(delegans).97  This second type of novation is called delegation. 
If the novation agreement is void it has no effect on the original obligation98 and if it 
is voided on the ground of, for example, fraud, duress or undue influence, the creditor 
can also revert to the original obligation.99 
When the original obligation is extinguished by an effective novation, pledges and 
securities held in respect of the obligation are released, sureties for due performance 
are discharged, and interest in respect of it ceases to run.100 
In terms of delegation a new creditor may be substituted for the original creditor101 or 
a new debtor may be substituted for the original debtor.  In both cases the delegation 
will only be valid if the agreement is concluded with all three parties concerned.102  
An agreement between only two of the parties cannot effect a delegation.103  
Delegation results in the discharge of the original debt.104  
2.4.4 Compromise (transactio) 
A compromise is an agreement105 by which parties agree to settle an outstanding 
dispute between them.106  If the dispute concerns an existing obligation, that obligation 
                                                 
96
 The content of the obligation need not necessarily change. The parties may e.g. reconstitute an 
obligation by way of novation without a change in content, in order to counter the operation of 
prescription – Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.3.2 at p 531. 
97
 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.3.2 at p 531 
98
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 239 and cases cited in footnote 15 
99
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 239 and cases cited in footnote 16 
100
 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.3.2 at p 534 
101
 Refer Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 239 and the case cited in footnote 19. This substitution of 
one creditor for another by a novation agreement must not be confused with a cession. In the case of a 
cession the right which the creditor has in terms of a particular obligation is transferred to another. The 
obligation continues to exist; the cessionary merely acquires the same right that the cedent had. In the 
case of a delegation which substitutes one creditor for another, the original obligation between the old 
creditor and the debtor is extinguished and a new obligation between the new creditor and the debtor 
comes into existence. 
102
 As in the case of novation proper, there must be a clear intention to effect a delegation – Joubert and 
Faris, Vol 19 at para 239 
103
 Refer Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 239 and the cases cited in footnote 20. Without the consent 
of the creditor the agreement may simply be an undertaking by a third party to pay the creditor. 
104
 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.3.2 at p 535 
105
 As such must comply with the general requirements imposed by law for the validity of agreements 
106
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 240 and cases cited in footnote 1  
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is terminated by the compromise.107 
It is a requirement for a valid compromise that there must be a dispute between the 
parties, although it is not required that the dispute must be the subject of litigation.108   
If a compromise is voided (e.g., because of fraud, duress or undue influence) it can 
have no effect on the obligation in dispute109 and the aggrieved party could still rely 
on the original disputed obligation.110 
A valid compromise extinguishes any legal relationship that may previously have 
existed between the parties.111 
2.4.5 Set-off 
Set-off (compensatio) takes place when debts are owed in such a way that two 
persons are the debtor and creditor of each other simultaneously.112  If both debts are 
for the same amount, they are discharged simultaneously and completely, and with 
them the obligations from which they arose.  If they are not for the same amount, the 
smaller debt and the obligation from which it arose are extinguished while the larger 
debt is reduced by the amount of the smaller.113 
Set-off has the same effect as payment114 but must also be distinguished from it.115  In 
Great North Farms (Edms) Bpk v Ras116 the judge quoted from In re Trans-African 
Insurance Co Ltd (in liquidation) (1958 W), 4 SA 324: 
“Set-off or compensation by our law is really equivalent to payment; it operates ipso 
facto as a discharge. So soon as there are two debts in existence between which there 
                                                 
107
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 240 
108
 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.3.3 at p 538 
109
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 240 and cases cited in footnote 5 
110
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 240 and cases cited in footnote 6 
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 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.3.3 at p 540 
112
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 243 
113
 Refer Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 243 
114
 Refer Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 243 and cases cited in footnote 2. Also refer Penny v 600 SA 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd [2003] JOL 10422 LC at p 6. 
115
 Absa Bank Limited v Standard Bank of SA Limited (1997 A), 4 All SA 673: “When a customer pays 
a cash amount equal to the debit balance of his overdrawn account into that account, there is no 
question of set-off operating. He simply pays the amount owing to the bank. The position is no 
different if the customer deposits a cheque drawn on another bank into his account. If his bank collects 
payment and effectively credits his account, the debt is likewise paid (or partially paid).” – Joubert and 
Faris, Vol 19 at para 243 and cases cited in footnote 3. 
116
 (1972 T), 4 All SA 124 
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is mutuality, so that the one can be compensated against the other, then by operation 
of law the one debt extinguishes the other pro tanto….”117 
Furthermore, in ITC 1440118 the judge said that “[i]n my view, it would be giving the 
word „paid‟ much too restricted a meaning if I were to hold that the appellant had not 
paid his former spouse the $100 which he set off.  He did actually pay her the money 
when he made her the loan.  Moreover, our law recognises methods of payment which 
do not involve the actual transfer of money viz., set-off and merger.”119 
A requirement for set-off is that the reciprocal debts must be due and enforceable.120  
This means that there cannot be set-off where the debt is conditional or it is subject to 
a time clause and the time stipulated in the agreement has not yet arrived.121   
A further requirement is that both debts must be liquidated, i.e., the debt must be 
capable of speedy and easy proof.122    
There is a wealth of dicta in the case law to the effect that the operation of set-off is 
automatic and ipso jure.123  In Schierhout v Union Government (Minister of Justice) 
1926 AD 286 it was stated that: 
“The doctrine of set-off with us is not derived from statute and regulated by rule of 
court, as in England. It is a recognised principle of our common law. When two 
parties are mutually indebted to each other, both debts being liquidated and fully due, 
then the doctrine of compensation comes into operation. The one debt extinguishes the 
other pro tanto as effectually as if payment had been made. Should one of the 
creditors seek thereafter to enforce his claim, the defendant would have to set up the 
defence of compensatio by bringing the facts to the notice of the court – as indeed the 
defence of payment would also have to be pleaded and proved. But, compensation 
once established, the claim would be regarded as extinguished from the moment the 
mutual debts were in existence together.”124 
However, there are also dicta in case law to the effect that set-off has to be invoked. 
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 As cited in Great North Farms (supra) at p 127 
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 (1987 Z), 51 SATC 1 
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 At p 5 
120
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 244 and authorities cited in footnote 13 
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 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 244 and case cited in footnote 14 
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 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 244 and authorities cited in footnote 17 
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Refer to Herrigel NO v Bon Roads Construction Co (Pty) Ltd and another,125 where it 
was said:  
“…once set-off is claimed or relied on, it relates back to the time when the two 
respective debts were mutually in existence.  However, if a party to an action wants to 
obtain the benefit of set-off, he must claim to be entitled to set-off….”126 
Even if set-off operates automatically and ipso jure the parties may still exclude its 
operation in a particular case by a prior agreement between them.127 
Whether set-off operates ipso jure or by way of reliance, the debts are extinguished at 
the moment when they first became capable of being set-off and the obligations are 
extinguished as effectively as if they have been discharged by performance.128 
2.4.6 Merger (confusio) 
Merger is where the capacities of a debtor and creditor are fused in the same person 
and in respect of the same obligation.129   
The obligation is extinguished, but only to the extent to which the merger of the two 
opposing capacities renders it impossible to exist, i.e. where the merger would 
effectively cause the person to be his own debtor or creditor. 130   
2.4.7 Extinctive prescription 
An obligation may be terminated by the passing of time if the creditor is inactive and 
fails to enforce his rights under the obligation within a certain time period.131  This 
manner of termination is also known as „extinctive prescription‟.   
Section 10(1) of the Prescription Act provides as follows: “…a debt shall be 
extinguished by prescription after the lapse of the period which in terms of the 
relevant law applies in respect of the prescription of such debt.”  Debt is therefore 
                                                 
125
 (1980 SWA), 4 SA 669 at p 676 
126
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 245 and authorities cited in footnote 18 
127
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 245 and case cited in footnote 19 
128
 Refer Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.4.2 at p 552 and Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at p 245 
129
 Refer Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.4.3 at p 553 and Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at p 246 
130
 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.4.3 at p 553 and Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at p 246 
131
 Joubert and Faris, Vol 19 at para 247 
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extinguished after the lapse of the time period applicable to that specific debt.132  The 
view has also been advanced that prescription does not automatically extinguish an 
obligation, but merely affords the debtor an election to refuse to perform.133 
Prescription in terms of the Prescription Act begins to run not necessarily when the 
debt arises, but only when it becomes due.134  However, where the debtor wilfully 
prevents the creditor from becoming aware of the debt, the period of prescription 
commences only when such knowledge is obtained.135   
2.4.8 Termination by non-fulfilment of suspensive or fulfilment of resolutive 
condition 
If a suspensive condition is not fulfilled or a resolutive condition is fulfilled the 
obligation subject to the condition is terminated.136   
A time clause is suspensive when it is stipulated that the date on which the debt falls 
due will be postponed until a fixed or determinable future time.  The effect thereof is 
that the stage at which the obligation becomes due and enforceable is postponed until 
the agreed date or time.137   
A time clause is resolutive when it provides that an obligation or obligations arising 
from the contract will be effective only until a certain date in the future.138  The effect 
thereof is that the obligation is extinguished on that date.  Rights and obligations that 
have accrued to the parties are not affected by the operation of a resolutive time 
clause, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.139 
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 Joubert and Faris, Vol 21 at para 123 and case cited in footnote 4 
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 Van der Merwe et al., 2007 para 13.4.4 and the authorities cited in footnote 368 
134
 Refer Joubert and Faris, Vol 21 at para 125 and cases cited in footnote 9. In Njongi v MEC 
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2.4.9 Termination by supervening impossibility of performance 
When it becomes impossible for a debtor to perform in terms of an agreement, the 
obligation is extinguished.140  Therefore, if the object of an obligation falls away, the 
obligation itself falls away.   
It has been said that the obligation is only extinguished if the impossibility is absolute 
(objective),141 i.e., impossible for everyone in the world.  However, impossibility of 
performance is determined with reference to the standard of conduct generally 
acceptable in business dealings in a particular community, which means that a 
particular performance might legally be regarded as impossible although theoretically 
possible.142  Mere difficulty of performance is not, however, sufficient to extinguish a 
debt.143  Furthermore, where performance only becomes partially impossible the 
whole obligation is not terminated, but the debtor is only released pro tanto.144 
When an obligation is extinguished by supervening impossibility of performance, any 
reciprocal obligation is also extinguished.145  There are circumstances where this is not 
the case and where the reciprocal obligation remains unaffected.  These are where the 
creditor is to blame for the impossibility of the debtor‟s performance146 or the creditor 
bears the risk of impossibility of the debtor‟s performance.147   
If performance becomes temporarily impossible148 the obligation is not extinguished.  
It is merely suspended for the period during which the impossibility continues and 
with it any reciprocal obligation is suspended.149 
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2.4.10 Cession 
Cession is a bilateral juristic act whereby a right is transferred by agreement from the 
creditor (cedent) to the transferee (cessionary),150 who thereafter becomes the creditor.  
Cession therefore concerns the transfer of rights rather than their demise.151 
It could be argued that the cession results in the termination of the obligation towards 
the original creditor.  However, the obligation remains intact and is merely transferred 
to the cessionary.152 
Furthermore, whereas other forms of termination agreements require an agreement 
involving both debtor and creditor, cession does not require the prior knowledge or 
consent of the debtor.153  Notice is also not a prerequisite154 for the validity of the 
cession. 
Cession will therefore not have the effect of the extinction of a debt. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Each of sections 8(4)(m) and 20(1)(a)(ii) and paragraph 12(5) use different phrases as 
its „requirement‟ for the extinction of a debt.  However, this does not mean that a 
specific section or paragraph would only apply in the case of the termination of debt 
in respect of the specific term used in that section or paragraph.   
For example, in section 8(4)(m) the debt should be extinguished as a result of “the 
cancellation, termination or variation of an agreement or due to the prescription, 
waiver or release of a claim for payment.”  Therefore, section 8(4)(m) could 
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potentially be applicable with regards to any „cancellation, termination or variation of 
an agreement‟ and not only because of „the prescription, waiver or release of a claim 
for payment.‟  Thus, even though the term „novation‟ is not specifically used in the 
section, it could still find application, because it would result in the termination of the 
original agreement for a new agreement, alternatively, it would at least result in a 
variation of the original agreement.   
Hence, it is important to determine, based on the facts and circumstances of each case, 
whether a specific action could fall foul of the provisions of the relevant section or 
paragraph of the ITA.  All other requirements of that section or paragraph should still 
be met before it could be applied. 
It is submitted that the extinction of debt for a consideration less than the face value 
of the debt is required for each of the relevant sections or paragraphs to find 
application.  Therefore, some act of forgiveness is required whereby the other party‟s 
debt is partially or wholly extinguished in law.155 
The first step would therefore be to determine whether there was an extinction of a 
debt as required by that section or paragraph.  Each case should thus be analysed and 
all the facts be considered in determining whether the specific section or paragraph 
could apply. 
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CHAPTER 3: DETAILS OF THE CASE STUDY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A BPR is an advance tax ruling regarding the application or interpretation of the ITA 
in respect of a proposed transaction that is issued in terms of section 76Q in response 
to an application by an applicant.156  A BPR therefore merely sets out SARS‟ opinion 
on its interpretation of a specific section(s) of the ITA and has no authority for any 
person other than the applicant thereof.157  It should also be noted that a BPR does not 
have a binding effect on the applicant of the ruling.  However, a BPR does give a 
clear indication of how SARS interprets a specific section and how it would deal with 
similar issues in practice. 
Hence, for the purpose of the case study, the main set of facts will be extracted from 
BPR 073 which was issued by SARS on 29 January 2010, dealing with the extinction 
of loans.  Those facts will be slightly adjusted and expanded to incorporate specific 
objectives that need to be answered throughout this research paper.  The facts will be 
incorporated into one proposed transaction.  This chapter sets out the facts of the case 
study. 
 
3.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS 
The facts that will be used to analyse the tax consequences on the extinction of debt 
within a group of companies and to evaluate the correctness of BPR 073 can be 
summarised as follows: 
3.2.1 The parties 
 V, a company incorporated in South Africa 
 W, X, Y, Z and AA, companies incorporated in South Africa which are wholly 
owned subsidiaries of V. 
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3.2.2 The transaction 
V advanced working capital to its subsidiaries over the years, and charged interest on 
the capital so advanced.  It also charged them an administration fee, rent and 
insurance over the years (hereinafter referred to as „on-charged expenditure‟), which 
was not paid by them but credited to their respective loan accounts with V.   
The subsidiary companies do not have the means to settle the amounts outstanding on 
the loan account and these loans will therefore be extinguished within the meanings 
provided for in sections 8(4)(m), 20(1)(a)(ii) and paragraph 12(5). 
3.2.2.1 Facts extracted from BPR 073 
 W has a balance of assessed loss but did not trade during the current year of 
assessment. 
 Y had a balance of assessed loss in a previous year but that balance of assessed 
loss was subsequently disallowed because the company did not trade during that 
year.  The company did not trade during the current year of assessment. 
 Z has a balance of assessed loss and traded during the current year of assessment. 
3.2.2.2 Additional case study facts 
 X has no balance of assessed loss and its only income was a management fee it 
received from V for certain services delivered to V.  The fee was calculated at 
arm‟s length and was not paid for but set-off against the loan account with V.  At 
the end of the current year of assessment, X has a balance outstanding to V. 
 AA entered into an interest-free loan agreement with V, which provided for that 
loan to be written off after a period of five years.  It used this money to settle its 
existing loan account with V. 
As noted above, the facts relating to W, Y and Z agree to that of BPR 073 and will be 
specifically tested against the ruling issued by SARS.  Those facts relating to X and 
AA are included for further analysis in this paper, and any conclusion will be based 
on the literature review. 
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3.2.3 Assumptions 
It is not entirely clear from the BPR whether „on-charged expenditure‟ includes 
interest charged by V on the working capital advanced.  On a strict reading of the 
ruling it would appear that it only refers to the administration fee, rent and insurance.  
However, in terms of the ruling it states that V will be entitled to deduct the amounts 
relating to on-charged expenditure, which became bad under the provisions of section 
11(i), to the extent that the amounts were included in income.  It is submitted that V 
would also be entitled to a bad debt claim in terms of section 11(i) for the interest that 
had become bad.158  It will therefore be assumed that „on-charged expenditure‟ refers 
to the administration fee, rent, insurance and interest. 
It is also not sufficiently clear from the ruling whether the term „expenditure‟ includes 
the administration fee, rent, insurance, interest and other expenditure financed with 
the working capital advanced by V or whether this does not include such other 
expenditure.  To give proper effect of the assumption above, it will further be 
assumed that „expenditure‟ refers to „on-charged expenditure‟ (as assumed above) and 
all other expenditure financed with the working capital advanced by V. 
3.2.4 The questions for consideration 
The main purpose is to understand the tax consequences for each of the subsidiaries 
when the debts are extinguished.  The tax consequences for V will not be examined in 
this paper.159   
 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
The main question has been outlined above and the answers provided in the ruling 
will be used as a starting block to answer that question.  The tax consequences will 
ultimately be tested against the provisions of sections 8(4)(m) and 20(1)(a)(ii) as well 
as the Eighth Schedule to the ITA.  
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CHAPTER 4: AN INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 8(4)(m) 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter the details of the case study were described.  In this chapter 
the current interpretation of section 8(4)(m) in the context of the case study will be 
examined.  The purpose is to comment on the correctness of the BPR with specific 
reference to section 8(4)(m).  The reasons necessary for the introduction of this 
section to the ITA will be considered briefly.  The effect of the Omnia Fertilizer case 
(supra) on the relevance of this section will also be considered (in the context of the 
comments of the judge on its relevance). 
 
4.2 THE INTRODUCTION OF SECTION 8(4)(m) 
Section 8(4)(m) reads as follows: 
“Subject to the provisions of section 20, where- 
(i) as a result of the cancellation, termination or variation of an agreement or 
due to the prescription, waiver or release of a claim for payment, any person was 
during any year of assessment relieved or partially relieved from the obligation to 
make payment of any expenditure actually incurred; 
(ii) such expenditure was at the date on which such person was so relieved or 
partially relieved not paid; and 
(iii) such expenditure or any allowance in relation to such expenditure was in the 
current or any previous year of assessment allowed as a deduction from such person‟s 
income, 
such person shall for the purposes of paragraph (a) be deemed to have recovered or 
recouped an amount equal to the amount of the obligation from which the person was 
so relieved or partially relieved during the year of assessment in which the person was 
so relieved or partially relieved.” 
This section was introduced into the ITA by section 6(1)(b) of Act No. 28 of 1997.   
The Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill, 1997 describes the reason for 
the introduction of this section as follows: 
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“Where any amount has in the current or any previous year of assessment been 
allowed as a deduction and such amount is subsequently recovered or recouped, such 
amount is included in a person‟s taxable income in terms of section 8(4)(a).  At 
present it is uncertain whether amounts not actually recovered or recouped, may be 
recouped in terms of this section.  To remove any uncertainty in this regard, it is 
proposed that where an amount of any expenditure actually incurred has been allowed 
as a deduction, but has not yet been paid and the obligation to pay such amount is 
subsequently reduced or extinguished, by reason of either the termination or variation 
of an agreement or prescription or waiver of a claim, the amount so reduced or 
extinguished will, under the provisions of the proposed section 8(4)(m), be deemed to 
be recovered or recouped for the purposes of section 8(4)(a).  The effect of the 
amendment is therefore that the amount of the obligation so reduced or extinguished 
will, to the extent that it was allowed as a deduction, be included in gross income for 
the year of assessment during which the obligation is reduced or extinguished.”160 
Zeller Karro161 commented on the introduction of this section and stated that in the 
past (prior to the introduction of section 8(4)(m)) it was reasonably widely accepted 
that recoupments could only be subject to tax if there was an actual receipt or accrual 
of the amount recouped.  The introduction of this section therefore clarified that 
amounts will be deemed to have been recovered or recouped (and thus be taxable) in 
the circumstances provided by section 8(4)(m). 
At the time of its introduction there were two Special Court cases dealing with similar 
issues.   
In ITC 1634,162 the taxpayer was a shipping agent that incurred liabilities on behalf of 
its principal.  In its books it raised a liability for amounts due to suppliers for services 
rendered and raised a debtor for the amount recoverable from the client as a regular 
part of its business.  From time to time the suppliers failed to issue an invoice to the 
taxpayer and, after a reasonable period of time, the taxpayer wrote these liabilities 
back to income.  The Commissioner had included these amounts in the taxpayer‟s 
income.  The taxpayer argued that the mere accounting entries reflected in the books 
of account, whereby the credit amounts were transferred from its balance sheet to 
profit through its income statement, could not result in any „amount‟ being received 
by or accruing to the taxpayer.  It further contended that it did not, as a consequence 
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of the accounting entries, derive any property and, because there was no receipt or 
accrual, the amount was not „gross income‟.  Furthermore, taxable income is an 
artificial concept, determined by identifying the gross income and deductions 
permitted under the ITA, without reference to the accounting policies and practices.   
The court said that, in the course of the taxpayer‟s business, amounts were subject to 
change.  Amounts of reduced or extinguished liabilities were benefits derived by a 
taxpayer in the course of carrying on its business and arose from the business or were 
incidents of it.  They „accrued‟ to it in the same way that an adjustment to a liability in 
a subsequent year, where the original liability had been underestimated, would be 
incurred in the year of adjustment, and be deductible.   
The Special Court found that there had been a recoupment of expenditure incurred, 
despite the fact that the creditor had not raised invoices.  Therefore, it rejected the 
contention of the taxpayer that no amounts had accrued as required by the income tax 
definition of „gross income‟ and that the credits were merely accounting entries.163 
In the other case, ITC 1704,164 the taxpayer argued that unless an amount had been 
„received or accrued‟, it would not have the characteristics required for inclusion in 
„gross income‟.   
The court found that the plain wording and effect of the definition of „gross income‟ 
was to include in gross income all amounts referred to in section 8(4)(a), i.e., amounts 
previously deducted and now recouped in the year of assessment.  It was not 
necessary for an amount to have been „received or accrued‟ for section 8(4)(a) to 
apply.165 
In both cases it was thus found that where a debtor is released from an obligation to 
pay a debt and the amounts were previously deducted for income tax purposes those 
amounts are subject to a recoupment in terms of section 8(4)(a).  The introduction of 
section 8(4)(m) was no doubt fuelled by these two cases, and was intended to put this 
issue beyond any further doubt. 
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4.3 THE RELEVANCE OF SECTION 8(4)(m) 
Lynette Olivier, on the introduction of section 8(4)(m), says that “[t]he subsection 
was no doubt added to counter the argument that no recoupment arises under the 
general recoupment provision, i.e., section 8(4)(a), where a debt that had been 
deducted for income tax purposes is recouped or recovered.”166  She goes on to say 
that “[i]nterestingly, the introduction of section 8(4)(m) for the purpose of recouping 
expenditure where the corresponding debt has prescribed was probably unnecessary.  
In both ITC 1634167 and ITC 1704168 it was held that such amounts are subject to 
recoupment in terms of section 8(4)(a).” 
Section 8(4)(a) reads as follows: 
“There shall be included in the taxpayer‟s income all amounts allowed to be deducted 
or set off under the provisions of sections 11 to 20, inclusive … whether in the current 
or any previous year of assessment which have been recovered or recouped during the 
current year of assessment ….”  
The purpose of the general recoupment provision (as contained in section 8(4)(a)) is 
to deny the taxpayer the benefit of a deduction or allowance by requiring the 
inclusion, in the taxpayer‟s income, of an amount allowed as a deduction or allowance 
that is later recovered or recouped.169  The taxpayer is therefore only allowed to claim 
a deduction if he ultimately bears the expense.170  It is therefore important to 
determine whether something happened which resulted in the taxpayer not actually 
bearing the expense for which a deduction was claimed.   
In Sub-Nigel Ltd v CIR171 it was held that “the court is not concerned with deductions 
which may be considered proper from an accountant‟s point of view or from the view 
of the prudent trader, but merely with the deductions which are permissible according 
to the language of the Act.”172  Expenditure would therefore only be deducted in the 
tax year in which a taxpayer incurs an unconditional legal obligation, even if that 
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obligation is only discharged in a later year.173   
Now, the question that arises is whether section 8(4)(a) requires the taxpayer to 
account as a recoupment an anticipated benefit in the form of a likely reduction of the 
amount required to discharge the liability, or an anticipated failure of the creditor to 
claim it, or only once the previously recognised legal obligation has been reduced.174 
Brincker175 notes that “[t]he question arises whether this section176 is still relevant 
pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Omnia Fertilizer Limited 
v CSARS.”177 
In Omnia Fertilizer (supra) the thrust of the argument for the taxpayer was that there 
cannot be a recoupment where the indebtedness that gave rise to an allowed deduction 
still exists in law.178  The taxpayer incurred expenditure for the purchase of raw 
materials.  Certain suppliers failed to claim payment and the taxpayer allocated these 
unclaimed amounts to income in its financial statements prior to the expiry of the 
three-year period after which the claim of the suppliers would have prescribed.   
The court noted that the word „recouped‟ in section 8(4)(a) has a wide meaning and 
would also include a scenario where the liability has not been extinguished.  Thus, 
even though the claim had not yet expired by way of prescription, here the word 
„recoup‟ means „to deduct, to take off or to keep back‟.  The court further held that 
although the relevant book entries did not in themselves result in the recoupment, the 
conduct of the taxpayer and surrounding circumstances confirmed that the taxpayer 
subjectively regarded the liabilities to have been recovered.  The judge ultimately said 
if the amount has for all practical purposes reverted back to the taxpayer‟s pocket, the 
amount would be recouped.  The judge held that: 
“Although the debts here were still legally due when the sums in issue were credited 
to income the vital consideration in my view is that s 8(4)(a) has to do with the 
recoupment of amounts, not the extinction of liabilities.  This indicates that the 
legislature contemplated that recoupment could occur despite the continuing chance 
that the taxpayer might after all be called on to pay.  The reason for that stance would 
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be, no doubt, that the legislature wished to ensure that if the deduction of expenditure 
was once allowed a taxpayer should not escape taxation if alleged expenditure was 
not to be expenditure after all, whether or not liability was legally terminated.  Had it 
been intended that an amount previously allowed as deductible expenditure would 
become taxable only if legal liability for payment ceased to exist (whether by way of 
prescription, agreement or otherwise) then the legislature could have said so simply. 
Instead it linked taxability only to recovery or recoupment.”179  
During argument it was indicated by Howie P that section 8(4)(m) still plays a role, as 
it deems a release from indebtedness to be a recoupment.  As the termination of a 
liability in itself is not a recoupment, but merely enables a recoupment, section 
8(4)(m) does therefore play a role.   
Howie P‟s reasoning can be summarised as follows: 
“Release from indebtedness is not entailed in the ordinary meanings of „recovered‟ or 
„recouped‟.  Termination of liability is not itself a recoupment.  It merely enables 
recoupment.  If anything the new paragraph detracts from the taxpayer‟s argument 
because it signifies that ordinarily the termination of legal liability is not a 
requirement for recoupment.  There was therefore a need for the inserted paragraph 
to introduce the deemed meaning.”180 
Brincker comments that “[t]his view is with respect questionable, as it is unlikely that 
the termination of a liability will not otherwise result in a recoupment.  If anything, 
the ambit of section 8(4)(m) is narrower than the interpretation of „recoup‟, as one can 
hardly envisage a scenario where a recoupment will take place after the termination of 
a liability, rather than before such date.”181  
Swart states that “[t]he court‟s reasoning and its underlying logic is rather difficult to 
follow.”182  He goes on to say that the court seems to suggest that the resultant saving 
will constitute a recoupment only once the taxpayer has recognised it as such in its 
books of account.   
It is difficult to understand how the court could place reliance on the accounting 
entries of a taxpayer given the number of cases that had held to the contrary.  It is 
submitted that the provisions covered by section 8(4)(m) would fall within the ambit 
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of section 8(4)(a) and that section 8(4)(m) does not add to the meaning of „recoup‟ 
within the context of section 8(4)(a).183   
That being said, we are bound by the Omnia Fertilizer judgement (supra) and, as a 
result, amounts that are still legally owed but which will probably not be claimed 
would be a recoupment in terms of section 8(4)(a),184 and an amount that is no longer 
legally enforceable could not fall within the ambit of section 8(4)(a) and would 
possibly be covered by the provisions of section 8(4)(m). 
 
4.4 ANALYSIS OF SECTION 8(4)(m) IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CASE 
STUDY 
The rest of this chapter proceeds to examine the current interpretation of section 
8(4)(m) with specific reference to the case study as set out in Chapter 3. 
4.4.1 Subject to the provisions of section 20 
Where two provisions are in conflict, the provision that is intended to be subordinate 
is made „subject to‟ the other provision.185   
In S v Marwane186 the Appeal Court considered the meaning of the words “subject to 
the provisions of this Constitution” appearing in section 93(1) of the Republic of 
Bophuthatswana Constitution Act 18 of 1977.  Miller JA, delivering the majority 
judgment, stated (at 747H-748A):   
“The words „subject to the provisions of this Constitution‟ in s 93(1) of the 
Constitution clearly govern the provision that laws in operation immediately prior to 
the commencement of the Constitution are to continue in operation. The purpose of the 
phrase „subject to‟ in such a context is to establish what is dominant and what 
subordinate or subservient; that to which a provision is „subject‟, is dominant – in 
case of conflict it prevails over that which is subject to it. Certainly, in the field of 
legislation, the phrase has this clear and accepted connotation. When the legislator 
wishes to convey that that which is now being enacted is not to prevail in 
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circumstances where it conflicts, or is inconsistent or incompatible, with a specified 
other enactment, it very frequently, if not almost invariably, qualifies such enactment 
by the method of declaring it to be „subject to‟ the other specified one. As Megarry J 
observed in C & J Clark v IRC (1973) 2 All ER 513 at 520: 'In my judgment, the 
phrase 'subject to' is a simple provision which merely subjects the provisions of the 
subject subsections to the provisions of the master subsections. When there is no 
clash, the phrase does nothing: if there is collision, the phrase shows what is to 
prevail‟.”187 
This dictum of Miller JA has been approved in subsequent cases, by (inter alia) both 
the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court: see, for example, Sentra-
Oes Koöperatief (supra); Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei and others 1995 (4) SA 
615 (CC) at para 27; Ynuico Ltd v Minister of Trade and Industry and others 1996 (3) 
SA 989 (CC) at para 8; and Ex Parte Speaker of the Western Cape Provincial 
Legislature: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Western Cape 1997 (4) SA 
795 (CC) at 32.   
In Hickman v The Attorney-General (1980 SR) 2 SA 583 at 585E, Golden J, on the 
meaning of the words „subject to‟, had this to say:   
“Generally speaking, the words „subject to‟ have the effect of introducing a 
qualification, limitation or condition precedent, thereby curtailing a person's exercise 
of otherwise unlimited or unrestricted rights ….”188 
Recently the Supreme Court in Attorney-General v Makamba189 held that: 
“The governing phrase „subject to subsection (2)‟ can only mean „Except as provided 
for by subsection (2)‟, or to similar effect, „Without prejudice to what is provided for 
by subsection (2)‟.”190 
Marlie191 concludes that section 8(4)(m) will not apply to any discharge of a debt that 
has already been taken into account in the reduction of the taxpayer‟s assessed loss (in 
terms of section 20(1)(a)(ii)).192  Where the assessed loss is completely wiped out by 
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the discharge of the debt, the balance of the discharge will be taxable under section 
8(4)(m), if it meets the requirements of that section.193   
Cilliers194 pointed out that, even if its own requirements are met, section 8(4)(m) can 
only come into play to the extent that the situation cannot be accounted for in terms of 
section 20(1)(a)(ii).  He states that this would occur if section 20(1)(a)(ii) cannot be 
applied or can only be applied partially because of the complete or partial non-
fulfilment (for example the „ordinary trade‟ requirement195 may apply to certain debts 
affected by the compromise, but not to others) of the requirements of section 
20(1)(a)(ii) itself.   
It is considered that section 8(4)(m) requires that any compromise be first used to 
reduce a balance of assessed loss brought forward.  The remaining balance, if any, is 
then brought into the calculation of „taxable income‟ as indicated above.  If the 
compromise exceeds the balance of assessed loss then the remainder of the 
compromise is brought into „income‟ as required by section 8(4)(m).”196  
The phrase „subject to‟ is used throughout the ITA and the question arises whether it 
carries the same meaning wherever it is used.197   
For instance, section 8(1)(b)(ii) is made „subject to‟ section 8(1)(b)(iii).  It is clear 
from analysing that section that subsection (iii) (the dominant provision) would apply 
where the travel allowance is based on actual distance travelled.  Subsection (ii) could 
never apply in that instance.  Therefore if subsection (iii) applies, subsection (ii) 
cannot be applicable.   
Also refer to section 13quat (7)(a) which is made „subject to‟ paragraph (d).  There, if 
the instances listed in paragraph (d) apply, the area demarcated may exceed the limits, 
notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a).   
In another example, section 20 is made „subject to‟ section 20A.  According to section 
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20 there shall be set off against the income derived by any person from carrying on 
any trade, for the purpose of determining taxable income, any assessed loss incurred 
by the taxpayer during the same year of assessment in carrying on any other trade.198  
Section 20A states that where a person carries on certain trades, any assessed loss 
incurred during that years in carrying on that trade may not be set off against any 
income of that person derived during that year otherwise than from the carrying on of 
that trade.  It should be noted that a taxpayer would still be able to set off assessed 
losses from trades not listed in section 20A against other income.  Therefore, to the 
extent that section 20A applies, section 20 could not apply, but section 20 could still 
apply to that same taxpayer even though section 20A also applies to that taxpayer, but 
only to the extent that section 20A does not apply.   
It is also noted that the dominant and subservient provision are normally cross-
referenced to indicate the extent to which the sections apply.  However, section 20 
does not refer back to section 8(4)(m) and there is thus no real indication of the extent 
to which that section applies.   
My own view is that the phrase „subject to‟ (in this context) should mean „to the 
extent that the taxpayer has a balance of assessed loss and the dominant provision 
applies, the subservient provision cannot also apply‟.  Therefore, if all the 
requirements of section 20(1)(a)(ii) are fulfilled and hence the section applies then 
section 8(4)(m) cannot also apply, but only to the extent of the balance of the assessed 
loss.   
It is further my opinion that where both provisions could be applicable they should be 
applied proportionately.199  The reason why I say this can be illustrated through the 
example that follows.  Consider Z mentioned in 3.2.2.1 as the taxpayer.  The balance 
of Z‟s assessed loss brought forward is R50 000 and the outstanding loan account 
with V amounts to R180 000, which comprises on-charged expenditure of R80 000 
and working capital funding of R100 000.  In terms of section 20(1)(a)(ii) the 
company will have to reduce the balance of its assessed loss in respect of the R80 000 
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and the R100 000.200  Only R50 000 of the total possible reduction of R180 000 would 
be used to reduce the balance of assessed loss.  After that reduction, the balance of the 
R80 000 not used in terms of section 20(1)(a)(ii) would be recouped in terms of 
section 8(4)(m).201  The issue is whether the reduction of the R50 000 balance of 
assessed loss in terms of section 20(1)(a)(ii) should be from the on-charged 
expenditure, other expenditure, or proportionately between the expenses.  Should it be 
from the on-charged expenditure it would mean that there will be a R50 000 reduction 
in the balance of assessed loss in terms of section 20(1)(a)(ii) and a R30 000 
recoupment in terms of section 8(4)(m).  On the other hand, if it is from the other 
expenses it would also mean a R50 000 reduction in the balance of assessed loss in 
terms of section 20(1)(a)(ii) but it would result in a R80 000 recoupment in terms of 
section 8(4)(m).  Based on the example above, it is my opinion that a fair and 
reasonable basis would be to apply it proportionately between the expenses. 
4.4.2 The obligation to make payment of any expenditure actually incurred 
The wording of this specific provision suggests that there needs to be a link between 
the obligation to make payment and the expenditure actually incurred.  The question 
therefore arises as to the closeness of this link.   
Marlie only submits that section 8(4)(m) requires that there be a direct link between 
the obligation that the taxpayer is being relieved of and the expenditure that was 
claimed as a deduction or allowance.202  He uses the following example to illustrate 
this:  
“Where the taxpayer purchases trading stock on credit, the resulting obligation is 
directly linked to the income tax deduction claimed in terms of section 11(a).  Any 
discharge of such debt will result in a recoupment of the deduction previously 
claimed.  Where the taxpayer however borrows money from a third party to purchase 
trading stock, the outstanding obligation is not directly linked to the purchase of the 
trading stock and any discharge of such obligation will arguably not give rise to the 
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recoupment of the deduction claimed.” 203   
Huxham and Haupt, 2010 (“Huxham and Haupt”) has the same view and uses the 
following example:  
“If stock was purchased on credit and the creditor was not paid, and the debt 
prescribed, the amount of the expenditure for the stock will be recouped.  If a loan was 
raised, however, and the proceeds of the loan were used to buy stock, then if the loan 
prescribes, no amount can be recouped because the expenditure for the purchase of 
the stock was actually paid.” 204   
Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs simply states that “the debt and the expenditure must be 
linked.”205  
The ITA specifically requires the taxpayer to be relieved (or partly relieved) from the 
obligation to make payment of any expenditure actually incurred.   
In the English case Allen (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Farquharson Brothers and Co206 
it was noted that “Expenditure means something or other which the trader pays out; I 
think some sort of volition is indicated.  He chooses to pay out some disbursement; it 
is an expense; it is something which comes out of his pocket.”  Watermeyer CJ said in 
Joffe and Co (supra) “expenditure usually means a voluntary payment of money.”207 
It is submitted in both Silke208 and Huxham and Haupt209 that the word „expenditure‟ is 
not restricted to an outlay of cash, but that the word „expenditure‟ includes outlays of 
amounts in a form other than cash.  It should also be noted that for the purpose of this 
subsection210 the legislature is not concerned with whether the expenditure is laid out 
for capital or revenue purposes.  It should further be noted that the wording of the 
subsection only refers to expenditure and does not also refer to the word „losses‟ as 
used in section 11(a).     
In Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR211 it was held that “expenditure actually incurred” does 
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not mean expenditure actually paid during the year of assessment.  It was said to 
mean “all expenditure for which a liability has been incurred during the year, whether 
the liability has been discharged during that year or not.”  Corbett JA held in Edgars 
Stores Ltd v CIR212 that “it is clear that only expenditure … in respect of which the 
taxpayer has incurred an unconditional legal obligation during the year of assessment 
in question may be deducted in terms of s 11(a) ….”213 
It is common cause that the obligation to repay borrowed money is not expenditure, 
neither is the actual repayment of the money borrowed.  However, if the loan is used 
to fund the payment of expenditure, would that link between the obligation and the 
payment of the expenditure be sufficient to cause the taxpayer to fall within the 
provisions of section 8(4)(m)(i)?   
It should be borne in mind that section 8(4)(m) deems an amount to be recovered or 
recouped for purposes of section 8(4)(a) and that amount is ultimately included in 
gross income.   
Also of relevance is the fact that section 20(1)(a)(ii) was amended and now 
specifically includes the wording “to the extent that the amount advanced … was 
used, directly or indirectly, to fund expenditure or an asset.”214  The legislature 
therefore clearly intended for the above scenario to be covered by section 20(1)(a)(ii).  
Therefore, if it was the intention of the legislature that this scenario should also be 
covered by section 8(4)(m) it can be reasonably assumed that it would have amended 
section 8(4)(m) at the same time that it amended section 20(1)(a)(ii).  The inference 
that can be drawn from this is that the legislature did not intend for that scenario to be 
covered by section 8(4)(m), alternatively, the legislature was of the opinion that it was 
already sufficiently covered by section 8(4)(m) in its current form.   
It was held in CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd215 that it is not every obtaining of physical 
control over money that constitutes a receipt for the purposes of the „gross income‟ 
definition.  If, for instance, money is obtained and banked by someone as the agent of 
another, the agent has not received it as his own income.  The court further stated that 
                                                 
212
 (1988 A), 50 SATC 81 
213
 Also refer Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI (1986 A); Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR 
(1936 CPD); Concentra (Pty) Ltd v CIR (1942 CPD) 
214
 Refer Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on section 20(1)(a)(ii) 
215
 (1955 A), 20 SATC 113 
 43 
borrowed money is not received by the borrower within the meaning of the definition 
of „gross income‟, since he falls under an obligation to repay such money.  It is 
therefore not received „for his own benefit‟.   
Should the obligation to repay the money be extinguished within the provisions of 
section 8(4)(m) (and ignoring the provisions of section 20(1)(a)(ii)216) there is a 
potential recoupment if the money was used to fund certain expenditure.   
In the instance where the money is borrowed to fund a specific expenditure and the 
terms of the agreement is such that the goods acquired remain the property of the 
financier until fully paid for, irrespective of the fact that the goods were paid for by 
the financier, it could be argued that the link between the obligation and the 
expenditure is close enough to bring it within the ambit of section 8(4)(m)(i).  
However, if a general pool of money is borrowed and no link to specific expenditure 
is agreed upon, it would be difficult to bring that obligation within the ambit of 
section 8(4)(m)(i).   
Therefore, a finance lease agreement entered into between a taxpayer and a bank to 
finance the purchase of a vehicle in respect of which a section 11(e) allowance was 
claimed could fall within the provisions of section 8(4)(m)(i) in the case of an 
extinction of that obligation.  It would however be difficult to bring an overdraft 
facility into the provision of section 8(4)(m)(i) even if the funds were used to finance 
trading stock for which a section 11(a) deduction was claimed, when the obligation to 
repay the overdraft facility is extinguished.   
4.4.3 Such expenditure was not paid 
„Pay‟217 means „to give, transfer, or hand over (money or its equivalent) in return for 
goods or services, or in discharge of an obligation‟.218  It is easy to establish when 
something has been paid where money changes hands in return for the expenditure.   
The issue arises where something other than money is transferred.  Again, if 
something is given specifically in exchange for that expenditure it would follow that 
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the obligation has been discharged and consequently the expenditure paid.  However, 
if different transactions are entered into between two companies with no reference to 
the other transactions and because of that both companies ultimately have obligations 
towards each other the question arises whether set-off could be applied with the effect 
that both obligations have been discharged and the expenditure consequently paid.219   
Marlie220 finds it difficult to understand why the legislature has deemed it fit to 
include a requirement that the expenditure must not be paid in order for section 
8(4)(m) to apply.  He submitted that a taxpayer could only be relieved from an 
obligation to make payment where payment has not been made, but did not validate 
this submission for the purpose of his paper.  It is noted that the section requires the 
expenditure to be unpaid at the date of relief or partial relief, and not the obligation.  
Marlie‟s submission that a taxpayer could only be relieved from an obligation to make 
payment where payment has not been made is therefore irrelevant for the purpose of 
analysing this section.   
The legislature therefore had to have had a reason for including this requirement in 
order for section 8(4)(m) to apply.  Hence, if it was the legislature‟s intention that 
even an indirect link between the obligation and expenditure (as discussed in 4.4.2) is 
necessary for section 8(4)(m) to apply this would mean that if the funds were actually 
used to pay for the expenditure then that expenditure should not be caught within the 
provisions of section 8(4)(m), irrespective of the fact that the obligation is still 
outstanding.  Therefore, if a company borrowed money from the bank to buy trading 
stock and pays for the trading stock with that borrowed money, the expenditure has 
been paid for, but the obligation to the bank remains outstanding.  Therefore, even if 
it is found that 8(4)(m)(i) is applicable, there would be no recoupment because 
8(4)(m)(ii) is not applicable.  This should put it beyond any doubt that there should be 
a direct link between the obligation and the expenditure for this section to be 
applicable.   
As it has been established that the obligation to repay borrowed money is not 
expenditure, therefore, if an obligation to repay borrowed money remains unpaid it 
cannot be said that any expenditure is not paid.  This can however only be determined 
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from the facts and circumstances of each case. 
4.4.4 Such expenditure was allowed as a deduction from income 
This requirement contained in subsection 8(4)(m)(iii) appears to be straightforward as 
it merely requires the expenditure to have been allowed as a deduction from income.  
Therefore, if the expenditure was not previously allowed as a deduction from income 
the provisions of section 8(4)(m) could not be applicable.  Unfortunately, tax is not 
always as simple, and it is submitted that this provision is not necessarily 
straightforward. 
The general deductions allowable in the determination of taxable income are 
contained in section 11.  Subsection 11(x) brings into the ambit of the general 
deduction provision any amounts which are allowed to be deducted in terms of any 
other provision in Part I of the ITA, from the income of the taxpayer.   
It is relatively easy to establish whether an amount has been allowed as a deduction 
from income.  The taxpayer would submit his annual return whereby he claims certain 
deductions from his income.  The Commissioner would then issue an assessment and 
would either allow all the deductions claimed or would disallow certain expenditure.  
Should the taxpayer not be in agreement with the adjustments made by the 
Commissioner, the taxpayer would object to the original assessment issued by the 
Commissioner and request that a revised assessment be issued.  Where the objection 
is allowed this means that the expenditure previously disallowed has now been 
allowed as a deduction from income for purposes of section 8(4)(m).  Furthermore, 
the Commissioner could initially have allowed all the taxpayer‟s deductions, but after 
an audit could have found that certain expenditure was incorrectly claimed and at that 
stage would disallow that expenditure. 
The issue that could arise would be in the case of an assessed loss.  The term 
„assessed loss‟ is defined in section 20(2) and means „any amount by which the 
deductions admissible under section 11 exceeded the income in respect of which they 
are so admissible.‟   
 46 
In Interpretation Note No. 33221 a balance of assessed loss is referred to as the assessed 
loss that is brought forward from the preceding year.  It therefore follows that there 
cannot be a balance of assessed loss without an assessed loss having been carried 
forward.  It is submitted that this is important in determining whether deductions had 
been allowed for purposes of section 8(4)(m).   
There are certain requirements that must be met before a company can carry forward 
its assessed loss.  All those requirements are not relevant for the purpose of this paper 
and will not be analysed in any further detail.222  Of relevance is the fact that should 
all the requirements not be met, the company will forfeit the right to carry forward its 
balance of assessed loss in terms of section 20(1)(a).  Where the taxpayer has an 
assessed loss carried forward from the previous year this loss will also rank as a 
deduction, which will go either to diminish the taxable income or increase the 
assessed loss for the year of assessment, as determined under section 20(1)(b).223   
The inferences that could be drawn from this are the following: (1) to the extent that 
the taxpayer has an assessed loss all deductions were not allowed and would only be 
allowed as soon as the taxpayer has sufficient taxable income to cover the balance of 
assessed loss or (2) because the taxpayer does not have a balance of assessed loss 
brought forward224 it could not have had an assessed loss to be carried forward and 
therefore its admissible deductions under section 11 could not have exceeded its 
income and thus certain deductions that were previously allowed were subsequently 
disallowed.   
It is conceded that there is no equity in tax,225 but we would otherwise have the 
anomaly where the taxpayer would not be allowed the deduction (balance of assessed 
loss forfeited) and would also be taxed on a recoupment in respect of that expenditure.   
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4.5 COMMENTS ON THE CASE STUDY 
As stated earlier, the facts relating to W, Y and Z agree to the facts stated in BPR 073 
and the ruling will therefore directly be tested against the findings above.  In terms of 
the ruling Z will have to take the portion of its benefit that is not set off against its 
balance of assessed loss under section 20(1)(a)(ii), which relates to expenditure that 
has been set off by Z against actual income into account as a recoupment.  
Furthermore, in terms of the ruling, W and Y must take into account as a recoupment 
the portion of its benefit that relates to expenditure that has been set off by each of 
them against actual income.   
SARS therefore interprets the phrase „subject to‟ (in this instance) to mean that the 
balance of the discharge226 will be taxable under section 8(4)(m) if it meets the 
requirements of that section, where the assessed loss is completely wiped out by the 
discharge of the debt.  There is no clear legal indication that this interpretation is 
correct and it would be interesting to test this in a court of law.  Legislative 
intervention is ultimately required to bring much needed certainty on the legislature‟s 
intention with regards to this matter.   
In terms of the ruling it appears that it is not only the on-charged expenditure that 
should be recouped but also all other expenditure referred to in the ruling.  This would 
include expenditure incurred with working capital advanced by the holding company 
and used by the subsidiary to pay for such expenditure.  This could not be correct 
because the expenditure has already been paid for and it could therefore not fall 
within the ambit of section 8(4)(m).  The unpaid expenditure would relate to the on-
charged expenditure and section 8(4)(m) could therefore only apply in respect of the 
on-charged expenditure.   
The ruling also does not take into account the fact that W and Y would have forfeited 
its balance of assessed loss.  As discussed in 4.4.4, those unpaid expenditure in 
respect of which the balance of assessed loss is not carried forward are effectively not 
allowed as a deduction and therefore section 8(4)(m) should, arguably, not be 
applicable in respect thereof.   
                                                 
226
 After the application of section 20(1)(a)(ii) 
 48 
The loan account between X and V would have to be analysed on a first-in-first-out 
basis to determine what portion of the outstanding balance relates to on-charged 
expenditure and what portion to other expenditure.  The portion that relates to on-
charged expenditure would have to be accounted for as a recoupment in terms of 
section 8(4)(m).  
AA would not account for a section 8(4)(m) recoupment because the on-charged 
expenditure has been paid for.227  This is despite the fact that the obligation is with the 
same creditor.  Furthermore, the resolutive time clause contained in the agreement 
does not detract from the validity of the agreement. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
If the ruling is a proper indication of how SARS interprets section 8(4)(m) it is 
evident that the taxpayer should not accept the ruling given by SARS.   
Legislative intervention is required to provide clarity on the issues mentioned above 
because it is difficult to imagine that the intention of the legislature with section 
8(4)(m) was properly interpreted by SARS when it issued the ruling.  
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CHAPTER 5: SECTION 20(1)(a)(ii) AND ITS INTERACTION 
WITH SECTION 8(4)(m) 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
When section 20(1)(a)(ii) was originally introduced it read as follows: 
“20. Set-off of assessed losses.-(1) For the purpose of determining the taxable income 
derived by any person from carrying on any trade within the Republic, there shall be 
set off against the income so derived by such person – 
(a) any balance of assessed loss incurred by the taxpayer in any previous year 
which has been carried forward from the preceding year of assessment: 
Provided that- 
(i) … 
(ii) the balance of assessed loss shall be reduced by the amount or value of any 
benefit received by or accruing to a person resulting from a concession 
granted by or a compromise made with his creditors whereby his liabilities to 
them have been reduced or extinguished, provided such liabilities arose in 
the ordinary course of trade.” 
Various academic writers and commentators have noted a number of issues relating to 
this section and have proposed certain amendments to resolve it.  The legislature 
subsequently amended228 this subsection and the intention of the latest amendment(s) 
to this section will now be analysed.  An attempt will be made to consider whether the 
issues identified by the various academic writers and commentators have now been 
addressed through the latest amendment(s). 
 
5.2 ANALYSIS OF SECTION 20(1)(a)(ii) 
Section 20 contains the provisions relating to assessed losses.   
The revised paragraph (ii) reads as follows: 
“20. Set-off of assessed losses.-(1) For the purpose of determining the taxable income 
derived by any person from carrying on any trade [within the Republic], there shall, 
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subject to section 20A, be set off against the income so derived by such person – 
(a) any balance of assessed loss incurred by the taxpayer in any previous year 
which has been carried forward from the preceding year of assessment: 
Provided that- 
(i) … and 
(ii) the balance of assessed loss shall be reduced by the amount or value of any 
benefit received by or accruing to a person resulting from a concession 
granted by or a compromise made with [his creditors] any creditor of such 
person whereby [his liabilities] any liability owed by such person to [them 
have] such creditor has been reduced or extinguished, [provided] to the 
extent that-  
(aa) the amount advanced by such [liabilities arose in the ordinary 
course of trade] creditor was used, directly or indirectly, to fund 
expenditure or an asset; and 
(bb) a deduction was allowed, in terms of section 11, in respect of such 
expenditure or asset;” 
5.2.1 Assessed loss229 
Section 20 could only be applicable if the taxpayer has a balance of assessed loss 
carried forward from the preceding year of assessment.  It has further been held that 
section 20(1)(a)(ii) could only be applicable if the taxpayer has a balance of assessed 
loss at the end of the current year of assessment.230   
In Louis Zinn (supra) Schreiner A.C.J. explained the determination of the balance of 
assessed loss as follows: 
“Whenever there has been a trading loss in the tax year, or where there has been a 
balance of assessed loss brought forward from the previous year, there has to be a 
determination of the balance of assessed loss to be carried forward into the next year. 
There may have been a profit in the tax year, but not large enough to obliterate the 
balance of assessed loss carried over from the previous year. Then the new balance of 
assessed loss will be smaller than the previous one. If there has been a working loss in 
the tax year the balance to go forward will be increased. If there has been no previous 
balance the assessed loss in the tax year will be the balance of assessed loss carried 
forward. The point to keep in mind is that, although at the stage where it is to be used, 
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i.e. when it is to be set off against a profit, a balance of assessed loss looks back to the 
past, at the stage when it is determined, i.e. when its amount is being calculated it 
looks forward to the future when it will be used. At the determination stage it is being 
prepared for future use ….” 
On determining whether a balance of assessed loss could be carried forward to a next 
year, Beyers JA said in New Urban Properties v SIR231 that: 
“According to both decisions subsection (3) envisages a continuity in setting off an 
assessed loss in every year succeeding the year in which it was originally incurred, so 
that in each succeeding year a balance can be struck to the satisfaction of the 
Secretary which can then be carried forward from year to year until it is exhausted; if, 
for any reason, the assessed loss cannot be so set off and balanced in any particular 
year, there is then no „balance of assessed loss‟ for that year which (viewed from that 
year of assessment) can be carried forward to the succeeding year, or (viewed from 
the succeeding year of assessment) there is no „balance of assessed loss which has 
been carried forward from the preceding year of assessment‟; in other words, the 
essential continuity has been fatally interrupted.” 
SARS is of the view that section 20 contains a trade requirement and an income from 
trade requirement.  According to SARS both requirements must be satisfied before an 
assessed loss may be carried forward.232  It is questionable whether the view of SARS 
is correct based on a proper interpretation of the ITA.233   
5.2.2 Amount or value of any benefit received by or accruing to 
5.2.2.1 Benefit 
The term „benefit‟ is not defined in the ITA but the meaning was considered in ITC 
1613.234  In that case a scheme of arrangement approved in terms of section 311 of the 
Companies Act No. 61 of 1973 resulted in the taxpayer being discharged from 
liquidation and the taxpayer became a wholly owned subsidiary of Datakor Ltd.  
Thereafter, Datakor Ltd, in terms of the scheme, was obliged to provide the taxpayer 
with certain funds to pay administration expenses and amounts due to secured and 
preferential creditors, and the balance remaining was to be used as a pro rata payment 
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to concurrent creditors.  The unpaid balance of the concurrent creditors‟ claims was 
capitalised by the creation of redeemable preference shares in the taxpayer equal to 
the face value of the claims.  As consideration for the shares, the concurrent creditors 
waived payment of their claims and received a dividend of 43.48 cents in the Rand.  
For every 100 cents of claims not paid a share with a nominal value of one cent was 
issued at a premium of 99 cents. The creditors then renounced the shares in favour of 
Datakor Ltd.   
The Special Court found that there had been a benefit and Wunsh J held that: 
“Any arrangement or dispensation by which a company is protected from action by its 
creditors so as to enable it to continue with its business, whether by means of a 
subordination agreement or the capitalisation of the claims, that is converting them 
into permanent or long-term capital, must redound to its benefit. It enables the 
company to be discharged from liquidation, to continue with its business under its 
directors and to have to deal with a single well-disposed shareholder instead of the 
existing creditors, who could once again seek the company‟s liquidation … Holders of 
redeemable preference shares cannot sue the company as creditors for the repayment 
of the capital when redemption becomes due, although they can, as shareholders, 
apply for a winding-up of the company … I have no doubt that the company derived a 
benefit from the arrangement and the conversion of the creditors‟ claims to share 
capital, relieving it of the need to find external funds to pay these claims which were 
due and payable.”235 
In the Supreme Court of Appeal Harmse JA said: 
“The benefit, in the words of the Act, is to be found in the reduction or extinction of 
debt, something which and the extent of which, as said before, is common cause.  
Indeed, the concession by creditors (to waive the balance of their eligible claims 
against the taxpayer in return for a nebulous „right‟ of redemption of redeemable 
preference shares) must of necessity translate into a benefit to the taxpayer.”236 
The Brummeria case237 concerned a group of companies (the taxpayers) that granted 
life rights over units in a sectional title scheme operating as a retirement village to the 
occupiers (life-right holders).  As a quid pro quo (in exchange) the life-right holders 
granted interest-free loans to the taxpayers for as long as they occupied the units.238  
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The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the right to use the loan capital interest free 
was a benefit to the taxpayer. 
It seems easy enough to determine whether there was a benefit, but each case will still 
have to be evaluated based on its own set of facts to determine whether there was 
actually a benefit to the taxpayer. 
5.2.2.2 Received by or accruing to a person 
It is submitted that the phrase „received by or accruing to‟ is similar to the reference in 
the definition of the term „gross income‟ in section 1, which refers to the total amount 
„received by or accrued to or in favour of‟ a person during a year or period of 
assessment.  The phrase „received by or accruing to‟ should therefore be given the 
same meaning as that attributed to it in case law.239  In other words, the term „received 
by or accruing to a person‟ must mean „received by the taxpayer on his own behalf for 
his own benefit‟.240   
5.2.2.3 Amount or value of any benefit 
The balance of assessed loss must be reduced by the amount or value of any benefit 
received by the taxpayer.  The requirement relating to the amount or value of a benefit 
usually poses no problem in traditional cases of release or compromise (where the 
amount/value is usually clearly equal to the face value of the extinguished/reduced 
debt), but in more complex cases it may become very difficult to ascertain whether it 
has been fulfilled.241   
Even though it was found, in both Datakor (supra) and Brummeria (supra), that there 
was a benefit which has a monetary value, the ascertainment of that value was left 
open in both cases.  In ITC 1613 (supra) at pp 194-195 it was said: 
“It is difficult, if at all possible, to quantify or place a value on the benefit derived by 
the appellant. It seems to me that it is only if the amount or value of the benefit is 
equivalent to the nominal amount of the claims that were converted into shares, that 
the value of the benefit can be quantified and then, indeed, at the amount of those 
claims. If a creditor forgoes a part of its claim against a company, the amount 
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abandoned is the amount of the benefit. Where a creditor accepts as a substitute for a 
part of its claim a stake in the company‟s capital, it is not immediately clear whether 
this is so … A benefit has an amount or a value if it has money‟s worth or can be 
turned into money. To be an „amount‟ something must have an ascertainable money 
value (cf Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Butcher Bros (Pty) Ltd 1945 AD 301 at 
pp 318-3214 and WH Lategan v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1926 CPD 203 at 
p 209) … A benefit has a money value or a worth in money to the extent that it 
compensates the recipient or saves it from expenditure or can be realised for money. 
The problem in the present case is that there is no way in which one can quantify the 
benefit received by the appellant on these principles ….” 
The judge in ITC 1613 (supra) went on to say at p 196 that: 
“I find it impossible, on what has been submitted to us, to quantify the benefit in 
monetary terms. The value of the benefit is not the whole face value or amount of the 
previously existing claims, having regard to the nature of redeemable preference 
share capital and other factors which require examination. In my opinion, without a 
prescribed formula or a deeming provision in the Income Tax Act, it is not possible to 
ascribe a monetary value to the benefit.” 
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Appeal judgement242 did not examine this 
requirement and found that the Special Court (delivering the judgement in ITC 1613 
(supra)) erred in placing the onus in respect of this requirement on the Commissioner.   
The Special Court (delivering the judgement in ITC 1613 (supra)) relied on the 
dictum in Silke243 and the judgement of the Butcher Bros case244 to support its 
decision.  The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the dictum in Silke (supra) did not 
support the Special Court‟s finding and appears to the contrary.  It also held that the 
facts in Butcher Bros (supra) were distinguishable from the present case and therefore 
of no assistance. 
In Brummeria (supra) the basis on which SARS valued those specific rights/benefits 
were not challenged by the taxpayer and the court merely accepted the approach taken 
by SARS without deciding on it.  SARS confirmed in Interpretation Note No. 33245 
that arm‟s length principles of valuation must be applied in each case, having regard 
to the facts and circumstances and the intention of the parties. 
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Hence, determining the amount or value of the benefit is still an important aspect of 
section 20(1)(a)(ii), and to which no clarity was given by the courts.  Furthermore, the 
legislature, it appears, deemed it unnecessary to intervene in respect thereof when it 
affected all the other amendments to this section. 
5.2.3 Any creditor 
The question of whether the section only applies where a concession or compromise 
is made with all the taxpayer‟s creditors or whether it also applies where a concession 
or compromise was made with only a portion of the taxpayer‟s creditors (or even a 
single creditor) has been a widely debated issue amongst academic commentators.   
Meyerowitz, 2005 (“Meyerowitz, 2005 edition”) expressed the view that “what the 
provision deals with is a general compromise with or concession by creditors and not 
an arrangement with an individual creditor …”246  De Koker, 2005 (“Silke, 2005 
edition”), on the other hand, noted that the section not only applies in the case of an 
arrangement with a body of creditors, but also to a release by one creditor (or only 
some of the creditors).247  Marlie concluded at p 60 that there is nothing in the 
wording of the section to indicate that the plural does not import the singular.  Cilliers 
stated that, arguably, it could not apply where only one creditor is involved.248 
It is submitted that after years of speculation this issue has finally been resolved 
through legislative intervention.  The revised section 20(1)(a)(ii) now makes it clear 
that a compromise with any creditor (i.e. one, some, or all) could cause the balance of 
assessed loss to be reduced. 
5.2.4 Liabilities arose in the ordinary course of trade 
Much uncertainty also surrounds the phrase “liabilities arose in the ordinary course of 
trade”.   
Meyerowitz249 concluded that “liabilities arising in the ordinary course of trade” 
would normally be liabilities in respect of which allowable deductions could be 
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claimed.  This would, for the most part, exclude expenditure of a capital nature.250  
Silke251 was of the view that there is a clear distinction between liabilities incurred on 
revenue account and liabilities incurred on capital account.  In his opinion only those 
incurred on revenue account was incurred in the ordinary course of trade.  Huxham 
and Haupt, 2005 (“Huxham and Haupt, 2005 edition”), on the other hand, contended 
that “as long as there is a link between the liability and the trading activities the 
liability has arisen in the ordinary course of trade whether it is of a capital or revenue 
nature.”252  Cilliers concluded that “the current law gravitates towards the view that 
capital expenditure incurred for the purposes of establishing or adding to income-
earning plant or equipment would usually not qualify as expenditure having arisen „in 
the ordinary course of trade.”253 
The requirement for „liabilities arose in the ordinary course of trade‟ no longer exist 
and has been substituted for the terms shown hereunder in an attempt to clarify its 
meaning.  According to the Explanatory Memorandum254 a previous issue relating to 
this section (20(1)(a)(ii)) was whether the liability must be linked to the expenditure 
in respect of which a deduction or allowance was allowed.  It concluded that the 
amendments were aimed at clarifying the position in that regard. 
5.2.4.1 Amount advanced was used, directly or indirectly, to fund expenditure or an 
asset 
Through this amendment it appears as if the intention was that the capital or revenue 
nature was not important in establishing whether „liabilities arose in the ordinary 
course of trade‟.  It is for that reason that the legislature substituted it with the 
wording „expenditure‟ or „an asset‟ to make it clear that this section now covers both 
revenue and capital expenditure.   
Again, an important point for consideration (as is in the case of section 8(4)(m)255) is 
the link between the liability and the expenditure or asset.  An interesting twist to this 
latest amendment is that it now does not require the taxpayer to determine how the 
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liabilities arose, but only how it was ultimately used or applied.   
The obvious question is whether this was done deliberately, because it no longer 
hinges on the intention or purpose for which the money was borrowed.  The 
importance of „purpose‟ was illustrated in the following cases. 
In CIR v Standard Bank of SA Limited256 the court had to consider the deductibility of 
interest paid in terms of section 11(a) read with section 23(f) and 23(g).  Corbett JA 
formulated certain principles established from Financier v COT,257 CIR v Genn & Co 
(Pty) Ltd258 and CIR v Allied Building Society.259  He stated that, in determining 
whether interest (or other like expenditure) incurred by a taxpayer in respect of 
moneys borrowed for use in his business is deductible, a distinction may in certain 
instances have to be drawn between the case where the taxpayer borrows a specific 
sum of money and applies it to an identifiable purpose, and the case where the 
taxpayer borrows money generally and upon a large scale in order to raise floating 
capital for use in its business.  In the former type of case both the purpose of the 
expenditure and what it actually affects can readily be determined and identified – a 
clear and close casual connection can be traced.  Both these factors are, therefore, 
important considerations in determining the deductibility of the expenditure.  In the 
latter type of case, however, there are certain factors that prevent the identification of 
such a casual connection and one cannot say that the expenditure was incurred in 
order to achieve a particular effect.  All that one can say is that in a general sense the 
expenditure is incurred in order to provide the institution with the capital with which 
to run its business, but it is not possible to link particular expenditure with the various 
ways in which the capital is in turn used.   
It is my opinion that the judge could thus correctly see that the ultimate use or 
destination of the borrowed money should not be considered as the deciding factor in 
that case. 
In A v COT260 the holding company waived its right to recover a portion of the debt 
from a subsidiary company.  The Rhodesian High Court held that “a liability incurred 
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by borrowing money for the purpose of financing the usual income-producing 
activities which constitute the trade of the taxpayer is a liability which arises in the 
ordinary course of trade.”261   
As can be seen from the A v COT judgement (supra) the purpose of the financing had 
to be considered in reaching a conclusion on that matter.  However, with the recent 
amendments, it appears that the purpose for borrowing the money would not 
necessarily be considered.  Again, whereas it would be easy to determine this where 
money was borrowed and used for a specific purpose it would be more difficult to 
adjudge where a pool of money was borrowed and used for general business 
purposes.  The legislature included the words “directly or indirectly” in a possible 
attempt to widen the application of this section.  Could this also have been an attempt 
by the legislature to counter the judgement by Corbett JA in the Standard Bank case 
(supra)?   
It is further noted that the section makes use of the phrase “to the extent that” and the 
inference drawn is that this would possibly allow for the apportionment of an amount 
to be deducted in terms of this section.   
5.2.4.2 Deduction was allowed, in terms of section 11, in respect of such expenditure 
or asset 
Only to the extent that the deductions were allowed in terms of section 11 would 
section 20(1)(a)(ii) apply.  However, section 11(x) includes as a deduction any 
amounts which in term of any provision in Part 1 (i.e., section 5 to section 37H 
inclusive) are allowed to be deducted from the income of the taxpayer.  Hence, it 
would appear that that the scope of the deductions extends to every admissible 
deduction under the ITA. 
Again, it would appear easy to determine whether a deduction was allowed, but as 
already pointed out in 4.4.4 there are certain instances where this is not easily 
determined.  However, this section could never be applicable if the taxpayer forfeits 
his balance of assessed loss because it requires a reduction of the balance of assessed 
loss.   
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5.3 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN SECTIONS 20(1)(a)(ii) and 8(4)(m) 
It is evident from the above that section 20(1)(a)(ii) could only apply if the taxpayer 
has a balance of assessed loss at the end of the year of assessment during which the 
extinction of the loan occurs.  If the taxpayer does not have a balance of assessed loss 
at the end of that year section 20(1)(a)(ii) could not apply, even if all the other 
requirements of that section are met.  In that case the requirements of section 8(4)(m) 
would be considered.   
Furthermore, section 8(4)(m) is made subject to section 20 and will therefore not 
apply if the taxpayer has a balance of assessed loss, i.e., if the requirements of section 
20(1)(a)(ii) are met.  However, it could, arguably, still apply where the amount of the 
benefit is sufficiently large enough to wipe out the balance of assessed loss, and the 
remaining portion of the benefit would then be accounted for in terms of section 
8(4)(m), providing those requirements are met.  Section 8(4)(m) should then be 
applied proportionately as illustrated in the example at 4.4.1. 
Section 20(1)(a)(ii) does not have the „expenditure was not paid‟ requirement as 
discussed in 4.4.3.  The ambit of section 20(1)(a)(ii) is therefore wider than that of 
section 8(4)(m) and it follows that the amount or value of the benefit to account for in 
terms of section 20(1)(a)(ii) and 8(4)(m) would not necessarily be the same.   
 
5.4 COMMENTS ON THE CASE STUDY 
The ruling states that the balance of the assessed loss of Z will have to be reduced, to 
the extent indicated in section 20(1)(a)(ii).  It further holds that section 20(1)(a)(ii) 
will not apply in respect of W and Y, as they do not have any balance of assessed loss 
as a result of having not carried on any trade during the year of assessment. 
As stated earlier, section 20(1)(a)(ii) could only apply where the taxpayer has a 
balance of assessed loss carried forward from the previous year.  The section could 
therefore only be applicable in respect of Z, being the only company with a balance of 
assessed loss carried forward. 
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It is interesting to note that this would also be correct in respect of AA if that 
company has no balance of assessed loss carried forward.262  
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The legislature finally amended section 20(1)(a)(ii) and brought much needed clarity 
to some of the past controversial issues.  It is noted that most of the questions of tax 
practitioners and academic writers have now be answered.   
However, the legislature obviously had no intention to make it too easy to interpret 
this section.  The result is that there are still some unanswered questions relating to 
this section and even a few new questions, as indicated in the discussion above. 
Hopefully the legislature will be bold and provide further clarity in future 
amendments to this section. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE EIGHTH 
SCHEDULE 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide a brief overview of paragraph 12(5) and other applicable 
paragraphs relating to the extinction of debt in general.  The group company 
exemption will be discussed to determine when this paragraph could be applicable in 
a group scenario.   
Paragraph 12(5) applies where a debt owed by a person to a creditor has been reduced 
or discharged by that creditor for no consideration or for a consideration which is less 
than the amount by which the face value of the debt has been so reduced or 
discharged.263 
The Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2002264 states 
that the purpose of this provision is to 
“. . . ensure that where a debtor is relieved of the obligation to pay any portion of the 
amount owing, [he] will be subject to CGT on a capital gain equal to the amount 
discharged. Such reductions may result from donations or offers of compromise. In 
this regard [it] refers to a debt being discharged without „full consideration‟ being 
given. The term „full consideration‟ is not defined but would seem to refer to a market 
related consideration. As a result where a debtor renegotiates the repayment terms, 
that debtor may end up settling the debt for a full consideration, which is less than the 
face value of the debt. This would result in the debtor escaping CGT on the amount 
discharged, [while] the creditor would be able to claim a capital loss in respect of the 
same amount. Paragraph 12(5) ensures that the difference between the amount of the 
debt so reduced and the amount of the consideration for the reduction or discharge is 
treated as a capital gain.”265  
Another objective of paragraph 12(5) is to provide symmetry in the tax system by 
ensuring that there is a matching of capital gains and losses.  In the absence of 
paragraph 12(5), creditors would be able to claim losses, while debtors would not be 
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taxed on the corresponding gains.266 
 
6.2 THE GROUP OF COMPANIES EXEMPTION 
It is necessary for the purpose of this paper to start this discussion with the group of 
companies‟ exemption because the case study specifically deals with the scenario of a 
group of companies.  An attempt will therefore be made to determine when the group 
exemption applies and in which cases it will not apply. 
6.2.1 Group of companies 
Paragraph 12(5) does not apply where the debtor and creditor are members of the 
same group of companies as defined in section 41.267   
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2003268 
describes the reason for the inclusion of this exemption as the potential tax 
consequences created by paragraph 12(5) on the deregistration or liquidation of 
dormant group companies.269   
The term „group of companies‟ is defined in section 1 and means two or more 
companies in which the controlling company270 directly or indirectly holds at least 70 
per cent of the shares of a controlled group company271 (alone or together with any 
controlled group company) and the controlling group company directly holds at least 
70 per cent of the equity shares in at least one controlled group company.  The 
narrower definition in section 41 excludes certain companies within the group.  Those 
exclusions are not relevant for the purpose of this paper and will not be considered 
further. 
Of relevance is the fact that the relief is limited to situations where both companies 
(debtor and creditor) are fully within the tax system (so that the elimination of a 
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capital gain for a taxable debtor is matched by the elimination of a capital loss for a 
taxable creditor).272 
The group of companies exemption, as described above, will not apply (i.e., the 
provisions of paragraph 12(5) do apply) in the following two circumstances: 
(A) The debt was acquired directly or indirectly from a person who is not a member 
of that group of companies – par 12(5)(bb)(A) 
This simply means that the group exemption will not apply if the debt was acquired 
directly or indirectly from non-members of the group.  It should also be noted that no 
time limit is imposed as to when the debt must have been acquired.   
(B) That person (debtor) or another person became members of that group of 
companies after the debt arose – par 12(5)(bb)(B) 
It is difficult to contemplate why the term „another person‟ was used in this context.  
It is my view that „another person‟ in this context means „any other person‟ which is 
very wide.  “In Baron & Jester v Eastern Metropolitan Local Council [2002] JOL 
9412 (W) Counsel for the appellant submitted, correctly, that the word „any‟ is prima 
facie a word of wide and unqualified generality.  I accept too the appellant's further 
contention that there is nothing in the language or context within which the word 
„any‟ appears which justifies placing a restriction on its wide and general meaning.”273 
Even if read as „another company and the creditor company‟,274 it is my opinion that it 
still does not clarify the legislature‟s intention.   
The current wording suggests that the group of companies exemption will not apply if 
any other person (another person) became part of the group of companies after the 
debt arose.275  If we explore the following example: HoldCo and SubCo are part of the 
same group of companies and SubCo (debtor) owes an amount to HoldCo (creditor).  
Based on the literal interpretation of this paragraph, it would appear that the group 
exemption would not apply if HoldCo acquired a 100 per cent interest in any other 
company (unrelated to the debt), i.e., any other company became part of the group of 
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companies.   
It is submitted that it could not have been the intention of the legislature for the relief 
provided in paragraph 12(5) not to apply simply because the group was enlarged with 
the addition of another company (unrelated to the debt).   
However, does this interpretation lead to an absurdity to make it necessary to depart 
from that meaning?  It is submitted that the literal meaning is not in line with the 
intention of the legislature which is demonstrated through the examples contained in 
the Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax,276 which shows that the exception is 
only intended to apply if either the debtor or creditor became a member of the group.   
It is difficult to imagine that the courts would depart from the perceived intention of 
the legislature as demonstrated in the Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains tax by 
McAllister above, but it could still be an interesting exercise to test this in a court of 
law, especially if the taxpayer wants paragraph 12(5) to apply.  This could be the case 
where the debtor has an assessed loss that would absorb the paragraph 12(5) capital 
gain or the creditor has a capital gain that would absorb the capital loss. 
However, a further requirement of the two circumstances mentioned above (A and B) 
is that these transactions must have been part of a scheme to avoid any tax otherwise 
imposed by virtue of the ITA.  It is interesting to note that the paragraph only refers to 
a scheme whereas the general anti-avoidance rules have always referred to a 
transaction, operation or scheme.  However, our courts277 have interpreted the term to 
be of such a wide meaning that it is submitted that the word „scheme‟ should be read 
in the context of the general anti-avoidance provisions of sections 80A-80L (the old 
section 103).   
In CIR v Conhage (Pty) Ltd278 Hefer JA stated that:  
“[w]ithin the bounds of any anti-avoidance provisions in the legislation, a taxpayer 
may minimise his tax liability by arranging his affairs in a suitable manner.  If e.g., 
the same commercial result can be achieved in different ways, he may enter into the 
type of transaction which does not attract tax or attracts less tax.  But, when it comes 
to considering whether by doing so he has succeeded in avoiding or reducing the tax, 
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the court will give effect to the true nature and substance of the transaction and will 
not be deceived by its form.”279  
It therefore follows that the general anti-avoidance provisions will only be considered 
once the true nature and substance of the transaction has been established.280  Also, a 
taxpayer may arrange his affairs in a suitable manner to minimise his tax liability.  
Refer to the often-quoted words of Lord Tomlin in the 1936 House of Lords decision 
in IRC v Duke of Westminster (1936) AC 1 where he said: 
“[e]very man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under 
the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be.”281 
The above concept of tax avoidance can be distinguished from tax evasion which is 
characterised by fraud and deceit.   
It is not clear whether the purpose or the effect of the „scheme‟ should be considered 
when considering if the transactions were part of a scheme to avoid any tax imposed 
by the ITA.  It has been said that the fact that a specific transaction results in a tax 
saving (tax avoidance) is not an indication that the purpose of the transaction was to 
avoid the liability to pay tax.282  It is submitted that the wording used by the legislature 
alludes more to the purpose of the transaction, and the intention of the taxpayer will 
thus be important to determine whether the transaction was part of a scheme to avoid 
any tax that would otherwise be imposed.283  This is because, if it were not for this 
transaction, paragraph 12(5) would apply, which would result in a capital gain in the 
hands of the debtor.  The application of the group of companies exemption would thus 
always have the effect of tax avoidance.   
Furthermore, there is no reference to „sole or main purpose‟ as used in the general 
anti-avoidance provisions.  Is the inference to be drawn that even a secondary 
intention of tax avoidance would render this part applicable?  It is submitted that the 
legislature‟s intention could not have been to exclude genuine business transactions 
and therefore the main intention with the scheme had to have been tax avoidance.   
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It is proposed that the legislature amend this paragraph to give proper effect to its 
intention. 
6.2.2 Connected person 
Paragraph 12(5) also does not apply where the debtor company is a connected 
person284 in relation to the creditor and the reduction or discharge was made in the 
course or in anticipation of the liquidation, winding up, deregistration or final 
termination of the corporate existence of the debtor company.  The relief is only 
provided to the extent that the amount of the reduction or discharge did not exceed the 
amount of the creditor‟s expenditure contemplated in paragraph 20 of the debt at the 
time of the reduction or discharge.285  This is only applicable to any reduction or 
discharge after 1 February 2006.286   
However, similar to the group of exemption, the relief287 will not apply if the debtor 
company became a connected person in relation to the creditor after the debt arose288 
and these transactions are part of a scheme to avoid any tax otherwise imposed by 
virtue of the ITA.289  The exclusion contemplated in paragraph 12(5)(a)(cc) will also 
not apply if the debtor company has not within 18 months taken the necessary steps to 
liquidate, wind up, deregister or finally terminate its corporate existence290 or has 
withdrawn steps taken to that effect291 or does anything to invalidate the steps already 
taken.292   
It should also be noted that any tax which becomes payable because of the application 
of paragraph 12(5)(c) must be recovered from the debtor company and the creditor 
company who shall be jointly and severally liable for the tax. 
6.2.3 Other exclusions 
Paragraph 12(5) will also not apply where the amount of the reduction or discharge 
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constitutes a capital gain in terms of paragraph 3(b)(ii) or it has been taken into 
account in terms of section 8(4)(m) or 20(1)(a)(ii) or paragraph 20(3). 
 
6.3 RELEVANT LEGISLATION 
It is submitted that the following paragraphs of the Eighth Schedule could apply to the 
extinction of loans.  A brief analysis of these sections follows. 
6.3.1 Paragraph 12(5) 
6.3.1.1 Subject to293 paragraph 67 
Paragraph 12(5) is made subject to paragraph 67.  Hence, paragraph 12(5) will not 
apply to the extent that it conflicts with paragraph 67, i.e., paragraph 67 takes 
precedence over paragraph 12(5).   
Paragraph 67 deals with the transfer of assets between spouses and allows certain 
rollover relief.294 
6.3.1.2 Debt owed295 
In terms of McAllister “[t]he words „debt owed‟ as used in paragraph 12(5) refers to 
amounts in respect of which there is an unconditional liability to pay.  This would, of 
course, include debts incurred which are not yet due and payable.”296   
6.3.1.3 By that creditor 
For paragraph 12(5) to find application it requires a reduction or discharge of the debt 
by the creditor.  Refer to the judgement of Lacock J hereunder where he confirms that 
a conscious act by the creditor is required for the paragraph to apply.297  It is however 
stated by McAllister298 that a creditor will in most cases be a party to a discharge, 
albeit indirectly, or through an act of omission.  He goes on to say that the fact that a 
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debt is discharged by operation of law does not necessarily mean that the creditor has 
not taken an action to discharge a debt.   
It is therefore important to consider the facts of each case and not only determine the 
intention and actions of the creditor but also to look at the surrounding circumstances 
through which the debt was extinguished.   
6.3.1.4 Consideration 
Paragraph 12(5) applies when a debt has been reduced or discharged for no 
consideration or for a consideration which is less than the face value of that debt.  
Boshoff AJP held in Ogus v SIR299 that “[i]n the context of s 58 the word 
„consideration‟ is used in the sense of a „quid pro quo‟, compensation or reward 
having some value.”  This meaning ascribed to the word „consideration‟ was also 
accepted in CSARS v Welch‟s Estate300 (also dealing with section 58).   
Section 58 deems a disposal of property for a consideration which is not adequate to 
be a donation.  It is submitted that this is similar to the provision in paragraph 12(5) 
and that in the context of paragraph 12(5) „consideration‟ also refers to the quid pro 
quo received. 
Paragraph 12(5) also refers to the phrase „face value of the debt.‟301  According to 
McAllister 302 the provision also applies regardless of whether the consideration given 
by the debtor is market related.303  An example is used whereby the debtor offers to 
pay the creditor a lesser sum (i.e., less than the face value of the debt) in full and final 
settlement in exchange for an early discharge304 of the debt.   
6.3.2 Paragraph 3(b)(ii) 
In terms of paragraph 3(b)(ii) a capital gain will arise when any part of the base cost 
of an asset that has been taken into account in determining the capital gain or capital 
loss in respect of that disposal has been recovered or recouped during the current year 
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of assessment and has not been taken into account in the re-determination of the 
capital gain or loss in terms of paragraph 25(2).   
According to the example used by McAllister it appears that the interaction between 
paragraph 12(5)(a) and paragraph 3(b)(ii) refers to a direct link between the asset and 
the debt in relation to that asset.  It is submitted that this intention of the legislature as 
described by McAllister that there should be a direct link between the asset and the 
debt in relation to that asset is not entirely clear from the reading of the ITA and the 
relevant paragraphs should therefore be amended to clarify the legislature‟s intention.   
6.3.3 Paragraph 20(3) 
Paragraph 20(3) allows for a reduction of the base cost305 of an asset by any amount 
which is or was allowable as a deduction in determining the taxable income of a 
person306 or has been reduced or recovered and is not otherwise included as gross 
income.  Therefore, if the seller waives a portion of the purchase price that reduction 
will not form part of the base cost of the asset.  The effect is that any future capital 
gain will be increased and any inclusion of the waiver in paragraph 12(5) would have 
resulted in double taxation.   
6.3.4 Paragraph 38 
When a person disposes of an asset to a connected person for a consideration that 
does not reflect an arm‟s length price, he is treated as having disposed of it for an 
amount received or accrued equal to the market value on the date of the disposal.  The 
person who acquires that asset is treated as having acquired it at a cost equal to its 
market value on the date of the disposal. This cost must be treated as an amount of 
expenditure actually incurred and paid for the purposes of paragraph 20(1)(a).   
This provision applies „subject to‟307 paragraph 12(5) and the Explanatory 
Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2002 provides the following 
reason: 
“Paragraph 38 in simple terms provides that transactions between connected persons 
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at a non-arm‟s length price must be treated as taking place at market value. 
Ostensibly this provision is at odds with paragraph 12(5) which deals with the waiver 
or cancellation of debt. Paragraph 12(5) provides that the debtor benefiting from the 
waiver of debt is deemed to have acquired the debt at a base cost of nil and to have 
immediately disposed of it at market value, thereby triggering a capital gain in the 
debtor‟s hands. On the face of it, therefore, paragraph 38 is at odds with 
paragraph 12(5). In terms of the principle of interpretation generalia specialibus non 
derogant, general provisions do not override specific provisions. Whilst the view is 
held that the specific provisions of paragraph 12(5) override the general provisions of 
paragraph 38, it is proposed for the purposes of clarity that paragraph 38 be made 
subject to paragraph 12(5).”308 
It should also be noted that the Corporate Rules309 could provide rollover relief in 
certain instances.310 
6.3.5 Paragraph 39 
When a person disposes of an asset to a connected person and makes a capital loss, 
that capital loss must be disregarded in the determination of the person‟s aggregate 
capital gain or loss.  The capital loss is effectively „ring-fenced‟ and may be deducted 
only from capital gains arising from disposals of assets to the same person and only if 
those persons are still connected persons at the time of the subsequent disposals. 
6.3.6 Paragraph 56 
Where a creditor disposes of a claim owed by a debtor, who is a connected person in 
relation to that creditor, the creditor must disregard any capital loss determined in 
consequence of that disposal.311  This paragraph applies „despite paragraph 39‟, which 
means that paragraph 56 takes precedence over paragraph 39.   
However, paragraph 56 does not apply to a capital loss determined in consequence of 
the disposal of a creditor of a claim owed by a debtor to the extent that the amount of 
the claim so disposed of represents a capital gain which is included in the 
determination of the aggregate capital gain or loss of that debtor by virtue of 
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paragraph 12(5)312 or an amount which was included in the gross income of any 
acquirer of the claim313 or an amount that was included in the gross income of the 
debtor or taken into account in the determination of the balance of assessed loss of the 
debtor in terms of section 20(1)(a)(ii).314 
 
6.4 CASE LAW 
To date there has been two cases dealing with paragraph 12(5), the facts of which can 
be summarised as follows. 
6.4.1 ITC 1793315 
In this case the deceased had sold some shares to her family trust on loan account.  On 
15 March 2002 she passed away with her last will and testament providing that the 
loan be bequeathed to the trust.  The Commissioner applied paragraph 12(5) and 
taxed the resulting capital gain in the trust‟s hands on the basis that the loan had been 
discharged for no consideration.  The assessment in dispute related to the 2003 year of 
assessment.   
One of the issues before the court was whether the amendment, making paragraph 
40(2) subject to paragraph 12(5), applied to the appellant.  Under section 130(2) of 
Act 74 of 2002 the amendment came into operation with effect from the 
commencement of years of assessment ending on or after 1 January 2003.  It was 
argued by counsel for the appellant that the amendment did not apply because the 
deceased‟s last year of assessment ended on her date of death.  Bertelsmann J rejected 
this argument, pointing out that it was the trust‟s year of assessment that was relevant.   
The court held that the creditor (the deceased) had discharged the debt for no 
consideration by operation of law when her last will and testament became effective 
upon her death.  The appeal was accordingly dismissed. 
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6.4.2 ITC 1835316 
In ITC 1835 (supra) a different result ensued.  On 16 March 1992 the testatrix 
executed a joint will with her husband.  She died on 10 June 2003, and under the joint 
will bequeathed the free residue of her estate to a family trust, which owed her R539 
189 at the date of her death.  In winding up the estate the executor did not collect the 
amount owing by the trust, but instead awarded it to the trust.  The Commissioner 
applied paragraph 12(5) to the trust on the basis that the loan had been discharged for 
no consideration. As a result the trust was subjected to CGT on a capital gain of R539 
189.   
In dealing with the crux of the matter Lacock J stated the following:  
“What is required in terms of this paragraph is an act by a creditor whereby he/she 
consciously intended to discharge a debt for no consideration. The determining factor 
is the intention of the creditor whereby he/she disposed of a debt or an asset, and not 
the subsequent manner in which that creditor‟s estate may be administered.”317 
The court distinguished the case from ITC 1793 (supra) in which the testatrix had 
specifically awarded a loan to a family trust as a legacy.   
After considering the evidence the court concluded that the testatrix did not intend to 
bequeath the loan to the trust and upheld the appeal. 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
In terms of the ruling it is easy to establish that paragraph 12(5) is not applicable in 
this instance.  However, as noted above, there are instances when the paragraph could 
apply notwithstanding the group of companies exemption.  There are even instances 
where the company would want it to apply.   
This remains a controversial provision to the ITA and will invariably be subject to 
further court cases, as that is the only way in which the interpretation of this 
paragraph will be clarified. 
                                                 
316
 (2008 K), 71 SATC 105 
317
 At para13.3 
 73 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The extinction of intra-group debt could occur by means of several different ways and 
these have been highlighted in this paper.318  Whether the extinction of a debt by 
means of a specific action could bring that action within the provisions of either one 
of or all of sections 8(4)(m), 20(1)(a)(ii) or paragraph 12(5) would depend on the facts 
and circumstances of each case.  It is therefore important not to look blindly at the 
specific terms used but to consider whether the different means of extinction of debt 
could be read into that section(s) or paragraph(s).  
It is arguable whether the introduction of section 8(4)(m) was necessary319 and is still 
relevant after the Omnia Fertilizer judgement (supra),320 but we are bound by this 
judgement and have to abide with the provisions of this section until such time as the 
judgement is overruled by a court of law or clarified through legislative intervention. 
The phrase „subject to‟ as used in section 8(4)(m) causes certain confusion, especially 
where both sections 8(4)(m) and 20(1)(a)(ii) could be applicable.  It is submitted that 
a proportionate allocation321 of expenditure would be a fair and reasonable approach 
until the legislature sets out the extent to which it would otherwise be applicable. 
There is no consensus on the closeness of the link between the obligation to make 
payment and the expenditure actually incurred, but it is submitted that the requirement 
in section 8(4)(m)(ii) that “expenditure was not paid” puts it beyond doubt that there 
should be a direct link between the obligation and the expenditure for section 8(4)(m) 
to apply.322  
It is submitted that it is relatively easy to determine if expenditure was allowed as a 
deduction from income, but in the case where a taxpayer forfeits his balance of 
assessed loss and have to account for a recoupment in terms of section 8(4)(m) it 
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would result in double taxation.  It is my opinion that if a taxpayer forfeits his balance 
of assessed loss then certain expenditure was consequently not allowed as a 
deduction, and section 8(4)(m) could therefore not be applicable.323  It is however 
recommended that the wording in section 8(4)(m) should be amended to avoid this 
potential anomaly. 
It is noted that the potential recoupment because of the extinction of intra-group debt 
in terms of section 8(4)(m) could potentially be avoided if money is borrowed, within 
the group, to actually pay for the expenditure.324  The general anti-avoidance 
provisions should however be considered. 
Section 20(1)(a)(ii) was amended in 2007 and resolved some of the issues raised by 
various tax commentators (e.g., which creditor – this could be one, some or all 
creditors;325 ordinary course of trade – this could be revenue or capital expenditure326).  
A number of issues remain unresolved and some new issues have been introduced 
(e.g., the amount or value of the benefit;327 a pool of money borrowed and used for 
general business purposes328).  Further legislative intervention is recommended in this 
regard. 
The ambit of section 20(1)(a)(ii) is wider than that of section 8(4)(m) and therefore 
the amount or value of the benefit in terms of the different sections would not 
necessarily be the same.329 
Where debt is extinguished within a group of companies paragraph 12(5) would not 
necessarily apply, because of the group of companies exemption.330  There are certain 
exceptions to this rule which should also be considered with the extinction of intra-
group debt.331  The only South African court cases on CGT dealt specifically with this 
paragraph 12(5) and, in my opinion, even more cases dealing with this paragraph 
could be expected. 
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7.2 CONCLUSION 
The incurring of debt is a worldwide occurrence that is very relevant in today‟s 
society.  The concept of financing within a group of companies is also widely used.  
When companies are unable to settle their debt it is important to determine whether 
the unintended extinction of this debt, because of the hardship that led to the 
termination of the debt, could also lead to unintended tax consequences. 
The ITA contains a number of provisions specifically dealing with the extinction of 
debt.  The most significant of these are contained in sections 8(4)(m) and 20(1)(a)(ii) 
and paragraph 12(5).  On numerous occasions our courts have been required to rule in 
respect of these provisions, and these sections have also gone through some changes 
in an attempt to give proper effect to the intention.   
Despite this, commentators still have different views on the interpretation of these 
sections and the application thereof.  The ruling issued by SARS shows that its 
interpretation thereof is also very different to that of some of the commentators.   
It is submitted that legislative intervention had laid certain issues to rest and 
adequately highlighted the legislature‟s intention, but the need for further legislative 
intervention still remains.   
In light of the above it is relevant to reiterate the words of Viscount Radcliffe in IRC v 
Frere332  
“[I had] never understood the procedure of extra-statutory concessions in the case of 
a body to whom at least the door of Parliament is opened every year for adjustment of 
the tax code.”333 
and the words of Scott LJ in Absalom v Talbot334  
“The fact that such extra-legal concessions have to be made to avoid unjust hardships 
is conclusive that there is something wrong with the legislation.”335  
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